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Disclaimer 
 
This is one of 12 Thematic Background Papers (TBP) that have been prepared as thematic background 
for the International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn 2004 (renewables 2004). A list of all 
papers can be found at the end of this document.  
 
Internationally recognised experts have prepared all TBPs. Many people have commented on earlier 
versions of this document. However, the responsibility for the content remains with the authors.  
 
Each TBP focusses on a different aspect of renewable energy and presents policy implications and 
recommendations. The purpose of the TBP is twofold, first to provide a substantive basis for 
discussions on the Conference Issue Paper (CIP) and, second, to provide some empirical facts and 
background information for the interested public. In building on the existing wealth of political debate 
and academic discourse, they point to different options and open questions on how to solve the most 
important problems in the field of renewable energies.  
 
All TBP are published in the conference documents as inputs to the preparation process. They can also 
be found on the conference website at www.renewables2004.de. 
  
  
 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
For renewable energy to make a significant contribution to economic development, job creation, 
reduced oil dependence, and lower greenhouse gas emissions, it will be essential to improve the 
efficiency of technologies, reduce their costs, and develop mature, self-sustaining industries to 
manufacture, install and maintain renewable energy systems. The goal must not be simply to install 
capacity, but to provide the conditions for creation of a sustained and profitable industry, which, in 
turn, will result in increased renewable energy capacity and generation, and will drive down costs. To 
achieve this end, a viable, clear and long-term government commitment is critical. Also essential are 
policies that create markets, and ensure a fair rate of return for investors.  
 
During the past decade, the world has witnessed double-digit growth in the wind and photovoltaic 
(PV) industries, significant advances in these technologies, and dramatic cost reductions. Today half a 
dozen countries represent roughly 80 percent of the world market for these technologies. Those 
countries have demonstrated that it is possible to create vibrant markets for renewable energy, and to 
do so very rapidly; but the record also shows that the renewable energy policies of most countries have 
been unsuccessful to date. 
 
Most of the renewable energy development experienced thus far has been driven by countries with 
feed-in, or pricing, systems. At the same time, a combination of policies is required, including 
standards, education, stakeholder involvement, and incentives to bring down the initial costs of 
investment and reduce risk, whether real or perceived. Ultimately, the effectiveness of policies in 
promoting renewable energy will depend on their design, enforcement, how well they address national 
circumstances, and the extent to which they are consistent and sustained. 
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1. Introduction 
For renewable energy to make as large as 
possible a contribution to economic 
development, job creation, lower oil 
dependence, and reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions, it will be essential to improve the 
efficiency of technologies, reduce their costs 
and develop mature, self-sustaining industries 
to manufacture, install and maintain those 
systems. Today’s energy markets include a 
number of obstacles that frustrate efforts to 
achieve these goals. Among the obstacles are 
lack of access to the electric grid at reasonable 
prices, high initial cost compared to 
conventional energy sources, and the 
widespread lack of awareness about the scale 
of resources available, the pace of 
development of renewable technologies, or the 
potential economic advantages of renewable 
energy.  
 
These barriers have been largely overcome in 
several countries, allowing a period of 
sustained double-digit growth in the solar and 
wind markets over the past decade, and 
providing policy models for other countries to 
adapt. These successful models show that a 
sustained renewable energy market can be 
developed quickly and efficiently if the right 
combination of policies is adopted. 
 
This paper examines which policies have been 
most effective in promoting renewable energy. 
It focuses primarily on grid-connected 
electricity and vehicle fuels, and briefly on 
remote uses of photovoltaics (PVs) and heat 
systems, with the assumption that the policy 
recommendations can be carried over to other 
types and uses of renewable technologies. 
“Success” of policies is defined to cover 
positive impacts on a range of factors, 
including: the installed capacity and energy 
generation from renewable energy 
technologies; technological advances; 
reductions in cost and price; domestic 
manufacturing capacity and related jobs; and 
public acceptance.  
 
1.1 Major barriers to renewable energy 
While most renewable fuels are free, 
renewable energy projects have high up-front 
costs, and a number of factors combine to 
make many renewable energies more 
expensive than conventional energy. 
Distortions resulting from unequal tax burdens 
and existing subsidies, and the failure to 
internalize all costs and benefits of energy 
production and use, erect high barriers to 
renewable energy. Additional cost barriers 
range from the cost of technologies themselves 
(and the need to achieve economies of scale in 
production), to the lack of access to affordable 
credit, and the costs of connecting with the 
grid and transmission charges, which often 
penalize intermittent energy sources. Import 
duties on renewable technologies and 
components also act to make renewable energy 
more costly. As a result, many of the cost 
barriers to renewables are perceived rather than 
real. 
 
In many countries, electric utilities maintain 
monopoly rights to produce, transmit and 
distribute electricity, or high costs or a lack of 
standards for connection and transmission 
discourage renewable energy projects. And 
everywhere, renewable energy must compete 
with financial and regulatory systems that have 
evolved to promote the development and use 
of fossil fuels and nuclear power, and that 
often discriminate against the use of renewable 
technologies. 
 
In addition, lack of information about available 
renewable energy resources and about the 
current state of renewable energy technologies, 
or misperceptions, lack of experience or 
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training, or negative past experiences with old 
technologies, and a lack of understanding 
about the benefits associated with renewable 
energy all act as barriers to their use. Each of 
these factors works to increase the perceived 
risks—technical and financial—of investing in 
renewable energy. 
 
For the most part, the barriers that exist in 
developing countries are similar to those in the 
industrial world. However, specific national 
characteristics, particularly within the 
developing world, can play an important role 
in determining barriers from one country to the 
next. Additional barriers in many developing 
countries include long travel distances to 
remote areas, poor transport and 
communication infrastructure, lack of trained 
personnel, and low literacy rates (Martinot et 
al, 2002). In addition, the perceived risk of 
investing in renewable energy projects in 
developing countries is high due to 
uncertainties about political, regulatory, and 
market stability (Frost 2003). In the past, donor 
aid has inhibited commercial markets, often 
reducing perceived value of renewable 
technologies (if they are free), while focusing 
little on models of development that can be 
viable, sustainable and replicable. And if 
people expect to be connected to the grid soon, 
due to unrealistic plans for grid extension or 
political promises, there is no incentive to 
invest in alternatives (Martinot, 2003). 
 
Finally, even government policies that are 
enacted to promote renewable energy can have 
negative impacts if they are inappropriate, 
inconsistent, or are too short-term. 
 
1.2 Policy mechanisms to be discussed 
Governments have a number of options that 
they can use to promote renewables. The first 
is to support the use of voluntary measures, 
particularly through education and information 
dissemination. This option has varying and 
limited effects. Second are environmental 
standards or energy taxes. The third option is 
to promote renewable energies through direct 
support, which is the focus of this report. 
Generally, a mix of instruments is essential and 
a key to success. The combination of policies 
needed depends on the costs of the technology 
used, location and conditions. 
 
There are five major categories of relevant 
policy mechanisms: 
• Regulations that govern capacity 
access to the market/electric grid and 
production or purchase obligations 
• Financial incentives 
• Industry standards, permitting and 
building codes 
• Education and information 
dissemination 
• Stakeholder involvement 
There is not necessarily a direct link between 
these policy mechanisms and specific obstacles 
to greater use of renewable energy, as some of 
the policy options tackle a combination of 
barriers. Each of these policy mechanisms is 
discussed below. An additional critical element 
is the need or a general change in government 
perspective and approach to energy policy.  
 
Government investments in research and 
development (R&D) are important as well. 
Ultimately, however, it is only by creating a 
market (demand-pull, rather than supply-push) 
for renewable energy technologies that the 
technological development, learning and 
economies of scale in production can come 
about to further advance renewables and 
reduce their costs. And as markets expand and 
industries grow, more private money is drawn 
into private research and development, which 
is often more successful than public R&D. 
(Sawin, 2001) See also TBP 7. 
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1.3 Some key points to consider 
Following are key points to frame the 
discussion below. The concluding section 
(chapter 6) includes more findings and policy 
recommendations. 
 
1) Experience to date has demonstrated that 
considerable intervention in energy markets is 
required to introduce significant amounts of 
renewable energy into the mix. Every country 
that has succeeded thus far in developing 
renewable energy on a substantial scale has 
been committed over the long-term to this 
goal, with consistent policies that include a 
package of policy mechanisms (consisting of 
all of the above-mentioned types).  
 
2) The effectiveness of government policies 
depends on how well they are designed and 
whether or not they are enforced. The use of a 
particular policy type does not guarantee 
success. In addition, policy makers must be 
cognizant of the projects and technologies they 
are trying to promote as such decisions 
determine the policy framework that is needed. 
For example, to promote technologies such as 
PV, solar thermal, heat pumps and wind 
turbines on a small-scale, distributed basis, 
support should be granted to the end customer; 
to promote large wind, biomass, geothermal, or 
marine technologies, the investment is more 
likely to be channelled through a large entity or 
company (Kleiburg, 2003). Further, each 
country has unique circumstances and must 
design its own system, and enact a 
combination of policies, based on needs, 
circumstances and available resources. 
 
3) The experiences of countries such as 
Denmark, Germany, Japan, Spain and Brazil 
have demonstrated that the key to steady and 
significant cost reductions is the development 
of consistent and reliable markets. Such 
conditions allow for the entry and maturation 
of small- and medium-scale enterprises, which 
have provided the bulk of the technological 
innovation that has driven down renewable 
energy costs. In addition to the “global 
learning curve” that exists for technologies 
such as wind turbines and PV cells, there is a 
“national learning curve” as individual 
countries develop domestic industries that are 
able to manufacture, install and maintain 
renewable energy systems using local 
equipment and labor. Those countries that do 
not yet have sizeable industries in place can 
expect dramatic price reductions in the first 
few years after effective new policies are 
introduced. 
 
4) Most of the policies discussed below 
involve some sort of subsidy, direct or indirect. 
Energy markets are not now and never have 
been fully competitive and open, and today’s 
markets include substantial institutional 
barriers, as well as long-term subsidies for 
conventional energy, that act as obstacles to 
renewable energy. Even market-oriented 
countries such as the United States and United 
Kingdom now agree that subsidizing 
renewable energy makes sense. Support for 
renewables is important not only to incorporate 
the external costs (environmental, social and 
security) of energy production and use, and 
make up for decades of past support for 
conventional energy. It is also essential to 
account for the environmental, social and 
security benefits associated with renewables—
including the reduced risk of fuel price 
volatility, a more diversified portfolio of 
energy options, a cleaner environment and 
better health, and job creation and economic 
development. Well-designed, modest 
production-based subsidies provided up front 
can work rapidly to close the cost gap between 
renewables and conventional energy systems.  
 
5) To date, feed-in—or pricing—systems have 
been responsible for most of the additions in 
renewable electricity capacity and generation, 
while driving down costs through technology 
advancement and economies of scale, and 
developing domestic industries. The record of 
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quota systems is more uneven thus far, with a 
tendency of stop-and-go, and boom and bust 
markets. It is important to recognize that both 
quota and pricing systems involve subsidies. 
But pricing systems have provided increased 
predictability and consistency in markets, 
which in turn have encouraged banks and other 
financial institutions to provide the capital 
required for investment. 
 
6) In developing countries, markets are apt to 
be particularly sensitive to the need for 
relatively uncomplicated access to the electric 
grid and low transaction costs. Pricing laws 
allow for ease of entry into the marketplace 
and tend to favor smaller companies and 
incremental investment, making them 
particularly suited to developing countries, 
where power markets are often small and 
dispersed. As in the industrial world, it is 
critical to focus on models of development that 
are viable, sustainable, and replicable, and that 
emphasize local participation and ownership; 
to date, donor aid projects have tended to 
reduce the perceived value of renewable 
energy while inhibiting commercial markets.   
 
2. Regulations Governing Market Access 
Access to the market, such as the electric grid, 
is imperative for renewables to gain a foothold, 
in industrial and developing nations. It is also 
important that systems not discriminate 
against, or give preference to, any particular 
kind of technology or generator with regard to 
access and charges for grid connections and 
transmission. In many countries, in both the 
industrial and developing worlds, there exist 
transmission-pricing penalties for intermittent 
generation. And, in many cases, where power 
markets have been opened to competition, 
investment in renewables (which are capital-
intensive) has been hindered in the absence of 
strong policies to promote renewable energy. 
In general, the impacts of privatization have 
depended on the specific policies and 
regulations in place.  
 
The regulatory framework is at least as 
important as subsidies for renewable energy. 
Two main types of regulatory policies have 
been used to open the grid to renewables. One 
guarantees price, another ensures market share 
through government mandated targets or 
quotas. The first is the fair access and standard 
pricing law, also called the renewable energy 
feed-in law.  
2.1 Feed-in laws - pricing systems 
Under the feed-in law—or pricing system, as it 
will be referred to from here on—electric 
utilities are obligated to enable renewable 
energy plants to connect to the electric grid, 
and they must purchase any electricity 
generated with renewable resources at fixed, 
minimum prices. These prices are generally set 
higher than the regular market price, and 
payments are usually guaranteed over a 
specified period of time. Tariffs may have a 
direct relationship with cost or price, or may be 
chosen instead to spur investment in 
renewables. 
 
The precursor to the pricing law was enacted in 
California during the 1980s. The U.S. Public 
Utilities Regulatory Act of 1978 (PURPA) 
required utilities to interconnect with and buy 
energy from “qualifying facilities,” including 
renewable energy plants, at incremental or 
avoided costs of production. In California, the 
implementation of PURPA involved the use of 
standardized long-term contracts with fixed 
(and, in some cases, increasing) payments for 
all or part of the contract term. The costs of the 
contracts were covered through higher electric 
rates for consumers. While these contracts 
proved costly, it is widely believed that the 
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alternative (nuclear power) would have been 
even more expensive. The time length of the 
contracts (15 to 30 years for wind projects), 
combined with fixed energy prices for much of 
that time, assured producers of a market for 
their product and finally gave them something 
they could take to the bank to obtain financing. 
While most other U.S. states saw little 
development during the 1980s, California for a 
time became the world’s leader in renewable 
energy use. (Sawin, 2001) 
 
The early pricing laws in Europe, in Denmark 
and Germany, also required that utilities give 
small wind and other private generators access 
to the electric grid, and they guaranteed 
producers a minimum share of the retail rate—
at least 85 percent in Denmark, and 90 percent 
in Germany. The German system was revised 
in 2000, and today most pricing laws provide a 
fixed payment for renewable electricity that 
varies by technology type, plant size, and 
occasionally by location (e.g., wind energy), 
and is generally based on the costs of 
generation. Payments guaranteed to new 
projects decline annually, and are adjusted 
every two years. The tariffs last for 20 years 
from date of project installation. German 
electric utilities now qualify for these 
payments as well. (Gerdes, 2000)  
 
The costs of higher payments to renewables 
are covered by an additional per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh) charge on all consumers according to 
their level of use (e.g., Spain, Germany as of 
2000), a charge on those customers of utilities 
required to purchase green electricity (e.g., 
Germany until 2000), or by taxpayers, or a 
combination of both (Denmark through feed-in 
rates and reimbursement of the carbon tax). 
Laws similar to Germany’s pricing law have 
been enacted in Spain, and several other 
European countries, including France, Austria, 
Portugal, and Greece, in addition to South 
Korea. Recently, Brazil enacted a law that 
combines pricing laws and quotas (specific 
capacity targets). 
 
It is important to note that pricing laws have 
not succeeded in every country that has 
enacted them. At the same time, to date, those 
countries that have experienced the most 
significant market growth and have created the 
strongest domestic industries have had pricing 
laws. In order to succeed, tariffs must be high 
enough to cover costs and encourage 
development of particular technologies; they 
also must be guaranteed for a time period long 
enough to assure investors of a high enough 
rate of return. The success of pricing laws is 
also determined by factors such as charges for 
access to the electric grid, limits set on 
qualifying capacity, and the ease of permitting 
and siting (influenced by the existence and 
specifics of national or regional standards).  
 
A variation on pricing laws, “net metering,” 
permits consumers to install small renewable 
systems at their homes or businesses and then 
to sell their excess electricity into the grid. 
This excess electricity must be purchased at 
wholesale market prices by the utility. In some 
cases, producers are paid for every kilowatt 
hour (kWh) they feed into the grid; in other 
cases they receive credit only to the point 
where their production equals their 
consumption. This option is available in Japan, 
Thailand, Canada, and at least 38 U.S. states, 
including Texas and California. It is of benefit 
to electricity providers as well as system 
owners, particularly in the case of PV, because 
excess power generated during peaking times 
can improve system load factors and offset the 
need for new peak load generating plants. 
 
Net metering differs from the access and 
pricing laws in Europe primarily in scale and 
implementation. Success in attracting new 
renewable energy investments and capacity 
depends on limits set on participation (capacity 
caps, number of customers, or share of peak 
demand); on the price paid, if any, for net 
excess generation; on the existence of grid 
connection standards; and on enforcement 
mechanisms. Without other financial 
incentives, net metering is not enough to 
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advance market penetration. Neither California 
nor Texas saw much benefit from net metering 
for wind power, let alone for more costly 
renewables like solar PVs, until other 
incentives were added to the mix. However, 
net metering might have a greater impact if 
private generators were to receive time-of-use 
rates for the electricity they put into the grid—
particularly in the case of PVs, which generate 
electricity at peak demand times when the 
value of their power is highest. Mandated 
targets or quotas, discussed below, and net 
metering can be used simultaneously.  
2.2 Quotas - mandating capacity or generation 
While pricing laws establish the price and let 
the market determine capacity and generation, 
mandated targets work in reverse—the 
government sets a target and lets the market 
determine the price. Typically, governments 
mandate a minimum share of capacity or 
generation of electricity (generally grid-
connected only), or a share of fuel, to come 
from renewable sources. The share required 
often increases gradually over time, with a 
specific final target and end-date. The mandate 
can be placed on producers, distributors or 
consumers.  
 
The simplest form of quota system is one in 
which the government imposes a mandate on 
one producer/supplier. For example, during the 
1990s, the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission ordered the electric utility 
Northern States Power to install successive 
amounts of wind energy capacity, thereby 
helping to open up the wind market in that 
U.S. state (Sawin, 2001). Quotas have also 
been used to promote the use of renewables off 
the grid, including alternative fuels. Several 
European countries now require that a specific 
share of diesel fuel contain biodiesel, and 
Brazil has become the world leader in ethanol 
production and use by requiring that ethanol 
make up a set share of all fuel sold (in 
combination with other support). Brazil’s 
success with quotas is discussed in more depth 
below. (See Box 1) 
 
The use of quotas for renewable electricity is a 
relatively new type of policy, first introduced 
in the late 1990s, so there is relatively little 
experience with quota systems to date. There 
are two main types of quota systems used 
today for electricity generation: 
obligation/certificate and tendering systems. 
The Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), 
widely used in U.S. states, is in the former 
category. Under an RPS, a political target is 
established for the minimum amount of 
capacity or generation that must come from 
renewables, with the amount generally 
increasing over time. Investors and generators 
then determine how they will comply—the 
type of technology to be used (except in the 
case where specific targets are established by 
technology type), the developers to do business 
with, the price and contract terms they will 
accept. At the end of the target period, 
electricity generators (or suppliers, depending 
on the policy design) must demonstrate, 
through the ownership of credits, that they are 
in compliance in order to avoid paying a 
penalty. Producers receive credit—in the form 
of “Green Certificates,” “Green Labels,” or 
“Renewable Energy Credits”—for the 
renewable electricity they generate. Such 
credits can be tradable or sellable, to serve as 
proof of meeting the legal obligation and to 
earn additional income. (Some countries have 
set floors and/or ceilings for the value that 
these certificates can achieve.) Those with too 
many certificates can trade or sell them; those 
with too few can build their own renewable 
capacity, buy electricity from other renewable 
plants (which generally involves a bidding 
process), or buy credits from others. Once the 
system has been established, government 
involvement includes the certifying of credits, 
and compliance monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Under tendering systems, regulators specify an 
amount of capacity or share of total electricity 
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to be achieved, and the maximum price per 
kWh. Project developers then submit price bids 
for contracts. The UK’s Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation (NFFO) was an early example of 
this type of policy. Governments set the 
desired level of generation from each resource, 
and the growth rates required over time. The 
criteria for evaluation are established prior to 
each round of bidding. In some cases, 
governments will require separate bids for 
different technologies, so that solar PV is not 
competing against wind energy projects, for 
example. Generally, proposals from potential 
developers are accepted starting with the 
lowest bid and working upwards, until the 
level of capacity or generation required is 
achieved. Those who win the bid are 
guaranteed their price for a specified period of 
time; on the flip side, electricity providers are 
obligated to purchase a certain amount of 
renewable electricity from winning producers 
at a premium price. The government covers the 
difference between the market reference price 
and the winning bid price. Each bidding round 
is a one-time competition for funds and 
contracts. In contrast, under the RPS, 
companies and projects must constantly 
compete in the marketplace, with existing and 
new projects, unless they have signed long-
term contracts. 
 
As with the pricing law, the additional costs of 
renewable energy under quota systems are paid 
through a special tax on electricity or by a 
higher rate charged to all electricity 
consumers. 
 
Thirteen U.S. states, covering 30 percent of the 
U.S. load, have mandated quotas through RPS 
laws (Hamrin, 2003). Quota systems are now 
in use in several other countries as well, 
including Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy 
and Australia. 
 
2.3 Discussion of pricing systems compared with quota systems 
Quota systems can be used for a range of 
technologies and fuels, while the pricing laws 
and RPS and tendering systems can be used 
only for electricity. The discussion below 
covers electricity only. (For heat and fuels, see 
chapters 3 and 4, and Box 1.) It looks at 
several issues that have been raised and 
debated regarding pricing laws and quotas, 
from their impacts on renewable capacity and 
generation, to costs and innovation. Note that 
section 2.4 summarizes much of the analysis 
below, with lists of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each system. 
2.3.1 Renewable energy capacity and generation 
Because quota systems establish specific 
targets for renewable capacity or generation, 
there is certainty regarding the future share of 
the market, and quotas can be tied directly to 
other government policies, such as emissions 
reductions. Quotas can provide producers and 
manufacturers with a predictable, steadily-
growing market for renewable energy (Lauber, 
2003). With pricing laws it is not possible to 
know in advance how much generation or 
capacity will result or, indeed, if the share of 
renewable energy generation will increase over 
the long-term. However, tariffs can be adjusted 
up or down to encourage more or less 
investment in renewable energy in order to 
bring installations in line with desired targets. 
In addition, under a quota system, the speed 
with which technologies are introduced is 
based on a political decision that might be 
largely unrelated to technical progress and the 
efficiency of using renewable energy (Krohn, 
2000). Those countries with pricing laws have 
regularly surpassed national renewables targets 
(Menanteau et al, 2003; Lauber, 2003; Meyer, 
2003). 
 
There are some concerns that mandated targets 
or quotas can set the upper limit for 
development. At least to date, Texas is 
evidence that this is not necessarily the case as 
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current renewables capacity in Texas is well 
above the required level. An RPS law is 
primarily responsible for the rapid growth of 
wind energy in Texas since 1999, when the 
state required that 2,000 MW of additional 
renewable capacity be installed within a 
decade. Texas was more than halfway there 
with wind alone by the end of 2002, and the 
target will likely be met before 2009. In 2001, 
Texas installed more wind capacity than the 
entire United States ever had before during the 
course of one year. At the same time, the 
combination of excellent winds in Texas and 
the U.S. federal Production Tax Credit 
(discussed below) make wind energy cost-
competitive or better, so it pays to invest in 
wind energy. Where circumstances are 
different, there might be no incentive to install 
more than the mandated amount of renewable 
capacity. As this type of system is still 
relatively new, it is not possible to know 
whether this will be the case.  
 
One fourth of U.S. states currently have RPS 
laws, and many of them have had far less 
success to date than Texas. This is due, at least 
in part, to the fact that some RPS requirements 
are not well designed—for example, they 
apply only to a small segment of the market, 
they have uncertain purchase obligations 
and/or end-dates, penalties for non-compliance 
are too low—or they are not enforced. Any one 
of these factors can limit the potential for a 
quota system to advance renewable energies 
(Wiser et al, 2000). But again, most of these 
laws have not been in place long enough to 
determine what their ultimate impact will be. 
 
As with pricing laws, many of these problems 
associated with quota systems can be 
overcome with careful system design. 
Regardless, some analysts believe that the 
lower purchase prices common under bidding 
or quota systems, due to competition, result in 
lower levels of installed capacity (Menanteau 
et al, 2003). In fact, pricing laws have 
consistently proved most successful at 
promoting the growth of renewable electricity 
capacity and generation. While more than 45 
countries installed wind capacity during the 
1990s, just three, with pricing laws—Germany, 
Denmark, and Spain—accounted for more than 
59 percent of total additions for the period 
1991 through 2001 (Sawin, 2003). When Spain 
passed a pricing law in 1994, relatively few 
wind turbines were spinning in the Spanish 
plains or mountains; by the end of 2002, the 
country ranked second in the world for wind 
installations, surpassed only by Germany. 
These advances in renewable capacity and 
electricity generation have translated into 
successes in other areas as well, from job 
creation and economic development to 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. For 
example, Denmark’s CO2 emissions dropped 
11 percent between 1990 and 2002, despite a 
28 percent increase in gross national product, 
due primarily to increased use of renewable 
energy and fuel switching from coal to natural 
gas (DME, 2003).  
 
However, Spain has had less success with solar 
PV. In 1998, Spain set PV tariffs that were 
similar to those provided in Germany. Despite 
having better solar resources, Spain installed 
little to no PV capacity over the next few 
years, while Germany’s market took off. This 
is because major barriers remained. For 
example, no grid connection regulations were 
established, so utilities could set their own, 
often exorbitant, charges to cover safety and 
other factors. Once this issue was resolved in 
2001, with national technical standards for grid 
connection, another barrier remained. PV 
producers who sold electricity into the grid, 
even households, had to register as businesses 
in order to pay income tax on their sales, a 
cumbersome and costly process which 
discouraged potential projects. (Bravo, 
undated; Muñoz, 2003) While there has been 
significant growth in Spanish PV 
manufacturing in recent years, most of this is 
attributable to the neighboring German market 
(Ristau, 2003). In France, creation of a pricing 
law was soon followed by a wave of 
applications for grid-connected wind farms—
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about 16,000 MW by early 2003 (Forster, 
2003). But just over 180 MW had been 
installed nationally by then (BTM Consult, 
2003). There are still high hurdles that wind 
(and other renewables) must overcome, 
including onerous building approval 
procedures and turbine spacing and capacity 
limits (Forster, 2003; Choy, 2003). Italy’s 
pricing law had little success for a number of 
reasons, including a lack of confidence in the 
continuity of the policy, a lack of standards, 
difficulty in obtaining financing, and problems 
in accessing the electric grid (Uh, 2003 and 
2004). 
 
Clearly, success with the pricing law is 
dependent upon the specifics of the law, and 
other policies enacted in parallel, particularly 
connections standards and charges. Successful 
combinations are discussed with regard to 
Germany’s experiences (see Box 2).  
2.3.2 Technological innovation, domestic industries and economic benefits 
Many analysts have argued that pricing laws 
do not encourage innovation (Martinot, 2002). 
It is true that generous tariffs alone provided 
under pricing systems are no guarantee that a 
domestic industry will develop. For instance, 
for most of the 1990s, renewable energy 
producers in Italy received more generous 
payments than did those in Germany, yet there 
was little impact on manufacturing industries 
in Italy despite significant wind resources, due 
greatly to the factors discussed above (Lauber, 
2003). However, others argue that once 
producers achieve a certain level of profit, they 
invest in private R&D to lower costs and 
increase their profit, a situation that is more 
favorable to “radical innovations” that require 
long payback periods than the circumstances 
created under quota systems (Lauber, 2003; 
Menanteau et al, 2003). With pricing systems, 
technological improvements increase profits, 
thereby encouraging innovation.  
 
Under quota systems, the surplus may go 
entirely to consumers and, as a result, 
producers do not receive enough profit (or 
reliable long term profits) to invest in R&D in 
order to reduce their costs. At the same time, 
pressure to minimize costs under quota 
systems often encourages producers to turn to 
overseas manufacturers of technology (Lauber, 
2003; Menanteau et al, 2003). In the United 
Kingdom, under the Non-Fossil Fuel 
Obligation, developers turned to foreign 
technology to keep costs down, and it became 
unprofitable for domestic manufacturers to 
remain in the market (Martinot, 2002). Further, 
bidding rounds can be time-consuming, costly, 
and can create cycles of stop-and-go. Because 
quotas often create on-off cycles, they do not 
allow for continuous development of the 
market, they discourage innovation, and they 
make it difficult to establish a strong domestic 
industry because investment in production 
facilities will take place only with a short-term 
perspective. This in turn limits potential job 
growth and economic development benefits 
associated with renewable energy (Wagner, 
2000; Martinot and Reiche, 2000). (The 
impacts of inconsistent, stop-and-go policies 
are discussed further in chapter 5.) No matter 
what type of policy is used, companies will try 
to maximize their profits. But in order to drive 
down system costs, it is essential to have 
sustained and growing markets and, to date, 
payment systems have most consistently 
provided such markets. 
 
Success of the wind industries in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain seems to bear this out. 
Turbine manufacturers in these three countries 
account for the majority of the world’s turbine 
market, supplying about 90 percent of the 
market in 2002, and have driven most of the 
technological development in the wind 
industry (BTM Consult, 2003). (See Chart 1) 
About 100,000 people worldwide are 
employed in the wind industry; of these, three 
fourths live in the EU and nearly half are in 
Germany (Millais, 2003; Sawin, 2003; Cox, 
2003). Approximately 130,000 people work in 
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the renewable energy industries in Germany 
(Höhn, 2003). In Spain, about 350 companies 
are involved in renewables industries and, in 
Navarre and Castilla-La Mancha alone, a new 
high-tech industry and more than 3,600 new 
jobs have been created because of the growth 
in renewable energy markets (IDAE in 
Gonzálvez, 2003; Iturriagagoitia, 2002).  
 
2.3.3 Geographic and ownership distribution 
Quota type schemes tend to promote the least-
cost projects, thus restricting them 
geographically to the areas with the best 
resources, and encouraging larger-scale, 
centralized projects (Lauber, 2003; Meyer, 
2003). In Texas, for example, most wind 
capacity has been installed in the windiest 
(western) part of the state. In an EU-wide 
system, this would likely result in significant 
wind development in the United Kingdom, 
while solar development would occur (if at all) 
primarily in sunnier southern countries.  
 
Such was the case with the early pricing laws 
as well. In the early 1990s, most of the wind 
development in Germany took place in the 
northern coastal states, leading regional 
utilities and consumers to bear the greatest 
financial burden of renewables development, 
and creating strong local opposition to wind 
energy (Twele, 1999; Sawin, 2003). This 
problem was overcome by adjusting payments 
to reflect differing costs of production in 
different regions—for example, wind turbines 
erected in areas (on-shore) with better wind 
resources have received lower payments than 
others. Some consider the pricing system to be 
a more flexible means for exploiting available 
resources because it allows for development in 
areas with varying levels of resource potential, 
assuming that tariffs vary by location (Meyer, 
2003). Such adjustments would be necessary 
under a regional system—such as an EU-wide 
system, for example—as well, to ensure that 
development is more evenly dispersed. This 
does make pricing systems more complex, 
however. Similar adjustments are not possible 
under quota-type systems, although specific 
targets could be set for each region, state or 
country. 
 
This situation raises concerns among some 
analysts that quota systems could have 
negative impacts on public acceptance of 
renewables (due to heavy development in 
particular regions) and on political support. 
Countries with relatively few resources (and 
thus experiencing less development, little job 
creation, etc.) would be less willing to support 
the more ambitious promotion of renewables in 
the future (Lauber, 2003). The Netherlands 
provides an example of this case: the 
government established a voluntary quota 
system with tradable credits that resulted in 
increased use of renewable energy. But about 
three fourths of the credits and accompanying 
subsidies went to foreign producers, leading 
the government to abandon this system 
(Lauber, 2003).  
 
In addition, in the longer term, there is concern 
that relying only on the windiest or sunniest 
regions will be insufficient to meet the 
growing need for renewable energy. In a 
system with one common price for green 
certificates, for example, there will be no 
incentive to develop in less resource-intensive 
areas if prices are too low; if prices are too 
high, developers of good sites will make 
windfall profits (Meyer, 2003). A system will 
then be required that promotes the use of a 
variety of renewable resources in areas with 
vastly different potential (Meyer, 2003). 
 
Some argue that pricing laws offer no inherent 
incentive for utilities to reduce institutional 
barriers to development of renewable energy. 
In fact, utilities can be driven to raise them, 
requiring the implementation of grid 
connection and charging standards (Lauber, 
2003). On the other hand, the lack of need for 
negotiated contracts, combined with the fact 
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that anyone has the right to install renewable 
technologies on their property and sell it into 
the grid, tends to ease entry into the 
marketplace. Pricing laws tend to favor smaller 
companies (even individuals or cooperatives) 
and incremental investment, leading to varying 
sizes of companies and projects. This aspect of 
pricing laws makes them particularly suited to 
developing countries, where power markets are 
often small and dispersed (Flavin, 2003). 
 
Quota systems are more likely to fully 
integrate renewables into existing electricity 
supply infrastructure as they put utilities in 
charge. At the same time, they could also result 
in serving primarily the interests of major 
suppliers or utilities (Lauber, 2003). Because 
they rely on competitive bidding, quotas can 
limit participation to the large players, 
concentrating renewable energy development 
in the hands of a few, often the major power 
generators. For example, one company in the 
United States (a subsidiary of the utility 
Florida Power & Light) owns about half of the 
nation’s wind capacity (Gipe, 2003). Local or 
smaller projects are often unable to compete 
with larger ones on the basis of cost alone 
(Wagner, 2000). Local investors are rarely 
wealthy, particularly in rural areas, and can 
seldom assume the risks and uncertainties 
associated with development under quota 
systems.  
 
Pricing systems also enable the average citizen 
to benefit from investments in renewable 
energy projects, and encourage installation of 
the most optimal sized project for a location, 
rather than capacities that meet only individual 
household or business needs. Also, because 
development is more geographically dispersed 
under pricing systems, there is generally less 
opposition to projects at the local level. As a 
result, the German pricing law has created a 
constituency in favor of renewable energy, 
such that farmers, lawyers, union workers, land 
owners, construction companies, renewable 
energy companies, and others lobbied 
alongside banks in favor of the law. This broad 
support has helped to overcome powerful 
political opposition that favors conventional 
energy technologies over renewables, and 
subsidies for existing fossil fuel and nuclear 
power over those for renewable energies. 
 
2.3.4 Technological diversity 
Because quota systems tend to encourage the 
least-cost technologies, they are best at 
promoting technologies that are closest to 
market competitiveness (Espey, 2000). For 
example, in Texas, where wind energy has 
advanced so rapidly, the RPS has done little to 
encourage the use of more expensive 
technologies such as solar PVs, despite vast 
solar resources in Texas. Higher-cost 
renewables, such as PV, offshore wind, wave 
and tidal energy will not be able to compete 
against the lowest-cost technologies, meaning 
that quota systems will not create markets for 
them and thus will not drive them down their 
“learning curves” (Kleiburg, 2003). 
 
 
 
Pricing laws, on the other hand, can encourage 
a diversity of technologies, assuming that 
payments vary according to technology type. 
Because they can create a market for all 
renewables, they can more easily support 
technologies from early development to market 
competitiveness. It is possible that quota 
systems might be able to overcome this 
shortcoming with specific standards for 
different technologies, as with the RPS enacted 
in the U.S. state of Nevada (which requires that 
a specific share of generation comes from solar 
energy). However, this tends to be more 
complicated, and to date there is not enough 
experience with this policy to know how 
effective it will be.  
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2.3.5 Costs, prices and competition 
It had been argued that it is difficult to control 
the costs of pricing laws over the short term, 
whereas subsidies can be controlled under 
bidding or quota systems. For example, if 
tariffs are set too high, they can encourage 
significant development and dramatically 
increase electric rates; if they are not high 
enough, the policy will bring about little 
development (Wiser et al, 2000). The pricing 
law could be more expensive than tendering 
programs or an RPS per kWh of electricity 
produced. According to one estimate, in 1998 
the Danish government paid out more than 100 
million Euros in subsidies to renewable 
energy, and additional costs in Germany 
totaled 200 million Euros in 2000 (Menanteau 
et al, 2003). However, several studies have 
concluded that the average additional cost per 
German household has been minimal.1  
 
In addition, it is argued there is less 
competition and cost minimization under 
pricing laws than with quota systems, in which 
developers must compete to win bids or gain 
contracts. Historically, it has been assumed 
that pricing laws do not inherently encourage 
cost or price reductions, and do not ensure 
least-cost development. The pricing law can 
drive down costs by driving economies of 
scale and innovation, and manufacturers and 
developers will compete for the lowest 
possible costs in order to achieve higher profit 
margins, which promotes cost reductions. Yet, 
developers have little incentive to pass these 
cost savings onto consumers as long as tariffs 
remain unchanged. Furthermore, under pricing 
systems, utilities and customers in resource-
rich areas can experience the brunt of costs 
associated with renewable energy 
development. 
 
However, most of these limitations can be 
overcome depending on how pricing systems 
are set up. Pricing policies can address cost 
and price issues through regular adjustments to 
tariffs for renewable energy in response to 
changes in technologies and the marketplace. 
This is now the case in Germany, where the 
law was changed in 2000 from a percentage of 
the retail rate to fixed tariffs; the French and 
Portuguese pricing laws have also adopted 
many of these features (Lauber, 2003). In 
addition, they can be established with help 
from research institutes (neutral consulting) 
and the renewables industry (with insight into 
the costs of production) as in Germany. The 
introduction of declining tariffs has brought the 
costs of the pricing and quota systems much 
closer together (Menanteau et al, 2003). And, 
at least one analyst believes that pricing laws 
have delivered renewable electricity more 
cheaply than have quota or green-certificate 
policies (Environment Daily, 2003). 
 
There is also some evidence, according to 
Nitsch et al, that it may be cheaper to provide 
significant national investment for renewable 
energy (through the German pricing law, for 
example) over a period of perhaps 15-20 years 
to bring renewable energy technologies rapidly 
down their learning curves, and thus reduce 
costs very quickly, rather than to introduce 
renewable energy relatively slowly and over a 
longer period of time—with an associated 
slower reduction in costs (Nitsch et al, 
2001/2002; Uh, 2004). 
 
Further, as discussed above, pricing systems 
encourage development of local manufacturing 
industries, which leads to a large number of 
companies and in itself creates competition. 
And even where pricing laws are more 
expensive per unit of energy produced, they 
drive technological development and 
strengthen or establish new businesses, thereby 
supporting industry and agriculture (biomass), 
leading to job creation and furthering 
economic growth (Uh, 2003). The use of well-
designed pricing laws can avoid the need for a 
host of other additional subsidies. They also 
help to “internalize external costs” of 
conventional energy and compensate for the 
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benefits of renewable energy (Wagner, 2002). 
Pricing laws encourage higher growth rates in 
early years than quota systems generally do, 
and encourage long-term innovation. Finally, 
concerns about heavy burdens in resource-rich 
areas can be addressed, as was the case in 
Germany, by spreading the costs around the 
entire country so that each region pays 
according to its total electricity consumption, 
rather than according to its resource base.  
 
Quota systems are generally credited with 
encouraging competition and dramatically 
driving down the cost and price of renewable 
energy. This appears to be true in a number of 
cases. One example often cited is the decline in 
wind energy prices under the UK’s Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation during the 1990s. Wind bids 
declined dramatically, from US$0.189/kWh in 
the first round to US$0.043/kWh in the last 
(Wiser et al, 2000). At the same time, it is 
unclear whether these reductions came about 
through the quota system (Espey, 2000). There 
is evidence that at least part of the reductions 
were due to the pricing policies of other 
countries, which drove technological 
improvements and brought down costs (Moore 
and Ihle, 1999). In addition, some of the later 
cost reductions under the NFFO were due to 
changing terms and conditions, including a 
longer contract period (Kleiburg, 2003).  
 
There is also speculation that the low costs and 
prices driven by the RPS in parts of the United 
States and Australia are due, at least in part, to 
the availability of wide-open spaces with good 
resources. This would explain the difference in 
wind energy costs between those countries and 
Germany and Spain (Lauber, 2003). Taking 
into account the relationship between wind 
speeds and the resultant power output (wind 
power is proportional to the cube of wind 
speed), costs under quota systems will come 
more in line with those of pricing laws once 
the best resources are no longer available (Uh, 
2003).2 
 
Particularly early on, when a country has few 
domestic manufacturers or developers, only a 
small number of companies might respond to 
bidding rounds, limiting choice and 
competition (Martinot and Reiche, 2000). 
According to some sources, a high degree of 
concentration of participants can lead to cartels 
and the abuse of market power (Espey, 2000). 
And if the price of credits or certificates is 
high, this can increase the electricity price paid 
by consumers, as is the case with pricing laws. 
However, this would likely be a short-term 
situation as higher certificate prices would 
encourage more development, thereby 
reducing certificate prices. Finally, if purchase 
obligations are large enough, quotas can lead 
to economies of scale, thereby reducing both 
costs and prices. 
 
There is some evidence that in quota systems 
which lack differentiation among technologies, 
such as the current Renewable Obligation 
Certificate (ROC) program in the United 
Kingdom, there is a tendency to over-subsidize 
lower-cost renewables such as onshore wind 
and biomass waste-to-power, a factor that will 
lead to higher costs (Kleiburg, 2003). Under 
the ROC system, the price paid for renewable 
electricity (most of which is wind power, in a 
country with the best winds in Europe) is 
similar to payments for wind energy in 
Germany (Mitchell, 2003). As a result, a great  
deal of development is underway, with a surge 
in market growth projected for 2004. But this 
makes it clear that the costs of renewably 
generated power are at least as dependent on 
how a particular policy is structured as they are 
on the system that is chosen. Quota based 
systems are not inherently cheaper, nor are 
pricing systems inherently more costly; the 
costs per unit of electricity produced depend 
on the details of those systems. (See Table 1 
for average prices paid for renewable 
electricity in several European countries.) 
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2.3.6 Financial security 
Under a pricing system, the long-term certainty 
that results from guaranteed prices over 
perhaps 20 years, means that companies are 
willing to invest in technology, to train staff, 
and establish other services and resources with 
a longer-term perspective. This certainty also 
makes it easier to obtain financing, as banks 
and other investors are assured a guaranteed 
rate of return over a specified period of time. 
In fact, even banks in Germany lobbied the 
Bundestag for a continuation of pricing laws in 
2000. 
 
With quota systems, there are potential 
uncertainties through many steps in the process 
from project planning to operation. For 
example, there can be substantial preparation 
costs for projects submitted for bids, adding an 
element of risk and uncertainty that many 
potential developers cannot afford (Menanteau 
et al, 2003). Without long-term contracts, 
under quota systems existing developers could 
be undersold by future projects, and will 
always be competing against new 
developments. While some see this is as a 
disadvantage, others view this as an incentive 
to reduce costs (Espey, 2000). This challenge 
has been resolved in Texas with 10-25 year 
contract requirements (Lauber, 2003). But 
unless such contracts are standardized, 
renewable energy developers must negotiate 
contracts with utilities or suppliers on an 
individual basis. While this could be a 
problem, to date in several U.S. states and 
elsewhere this does not seem to be a major 
drawback.  
 
Further, under quota systems potential 
investors must assess future supply and 
demand balance during the lifetime of the 
project (often 20 years or more) by developing 
a forward price curve. Yet, demand is created 
by political targets, which could change, 
thereby resulting in a degree of uncertainty. In 
addition, estimating supply is a complex 
process that requires an understanding of a 
broad range of factors. These include the 
current competitiveness of all eligible energy 
technologies; future costs – determined by 
learning curve effects; cost-resource curves, or 
the impact on costs when the best resources are 
no longer available and projects must be sited 
where wind speeds are lower, or rely on more 
expensive biomass feedstock, for example. All 
of these factors add to the level of uncertainty. 
Finally, if renewable technologies enjoy 
subsidies or other types of support (e.g., grid 
connection costs, tax credits, accelerated 
depreciation), whose continuation over the 
project lifetime is also uncertain, the risks to 
investors will be higher, requiring a higher 
projected rate of return. Under these 
circumstances, banks will also be less willing 
to provide financing for renewables projects. 
(Kleiburg, 2003)  
 
Sources of income are two-fold under a 
certificate-based quota system: first, is 
payment for the sale of renewably generated 
electricity and, second is income from the sale 
or trade of renewable energy certificates. The 
price of credits or certificates can fluctuate 
significantly with changes in the marketplace 
or meteorological variability, rising when there 
is a shortage of renewable electricity and 
falling when there is a surplus. Diversifying 
sources and location of projects can also 
reduce fluctuations due to meteorological 
variability. Establishing minimum and 
maximum certificate prices can help, but does 
not eliminate investor uncertainty (Meyer, 
2003). Trading in international markets can 
also work to stabilize prices, and risks can be 
limited through long-term contracts, or 
borrowing or banking of credits (Menanteau et 
al, 2003: Meyer, 2003). Some of these 
solutions, however, can increase the 
complexity of the system. Seasonal variations 
in output lead to variations in income from 
fixed tariffs as well, and market fixes are not 
built into the pricing system as they are with 
certificate models. Over time, however, these  
14 
 
 
variations will also be smoothed out (Meyer, 
2003). Further, under quota systems financial 
security is reduced if there is uncertainty 
around rules relating to green certificate 
trading. For instance, as system designs are 
altered—such as changes in penalties, 
borrowing or banking provisions, and the 
status of imports—prices can be affected 
dramatically (Kleiburg, 2003). In general, 
many believe that the higher risks and lower 
profits associated with quota systems make 
them less attractive for investors than pricing 
laws (Menanteau et al, 2003). 
 
Some analysts believe that quota systems 
provide more regulatory and financial stability 
and security than do pricing systems, which 
could change with the political winds (Lauber, 
2003). For example, long-term purchasing 
contracts with private entities are enforceable 
under the law, which might be safer than 
relying on consistency of government policy 
(Krohn, 2000). Others believe that pricing 
systems provide a greater sense of security 
than quota systems, particularly in developing 
countries, because there is not the same 
assurance that a market for renewable energy 
credits will exist and that they will be of value 
(Frost, 2003). Targets established under quota 
systems are also policy dependent and can 
change over time, affecting the value of 
certificates and creating uncertainty (Uh, 
2003). In addition, payment systems and levels 
are known at the outset under a pricing system; 
this is not necessarily the case under a quota 
system with certificate trading (Krohn, 2000). 
What is most important is political stability, 
and long-term, credible, consistent policies.  
2.3.7 Ease of implementation  
In general, pricing laws are easy to administer 
and enforce, and they are highly transparent. 
As with quota systems, policy makers are 
required to establish targets and timetables, 
and to determine which technologies are 
qualified (type and scale). Where applicable, 
pricing laws also require the setting of tariffs 
for each technology type (which can be done 
with the help of research institutes and 
industries, as in Germany). Once the system is 
established, the only government follow-up 
required is regular adjustments of tariffs 
(assuming this is done).  
 
Under quota systems, many of the 
requirements are far more challenging. Picking 
optimal target levels is critical (if they are set 
too high, they can push prices up dramatically; 
if they are too low, they will not produce the 
economies of scale needed to reduce costs), as 
is the choice of timetables. As mentioned in 
section 2.3.5, the same can be said for the 
setting of tariffs under pricing laws. However, 
they can be established with input from 
research institutes and industries, and pricing 
laws can be created to allow for adjustments as 
necessary. As discussed below, targets set 
under quota systems are not as flexible. In 
addition, policy makers must decide which 
technologies are eligible, and if there should be 
technology-specific targets—this will depend 
on the readiness of technologies, their costs, 
available resources, and other factors. In order 
to make successful choices, it is also important 
to understand the cost and learning curves for 
the relevant renewable technologies (Berry and 
Jaccard, 2001). Policy makers also need to 
determine which category of parties must meet 
the obligation (e.g., retail suppliers, grid 
companies, or distribution companies), and 
whether all or just a few of those parties are 
required to meet the targets. The penalty for 
non-compliance must be established, and the 
tradability, life-span and price (floor- or 
ceiling-prices?) of certificates or credits 
chosen. These decisions will all determine the 
impact of the quota system. Once these matters 
are resolved, government agencies (or other 
bodies) must certify renewable energy 
producers, issue and control certificates, 
15 
 
 
monitor compliance, and collect penalties, all 
of which increases administrative 
requirements, complexities and costs 
(Menanteau et al, 2003).  
 
Some argue that quota/certificate systems tend, 
by their very nature, to be more complex than 
pricing systems, difficult to administer, and 
open to utility manipulation, and that such 
problems could be even more significant in 
developing countries (Frost, 2003). On the 
other hand, others have noted that the system 
for cost-equalization under the German 
Renewable Energy Law (2000) is neither 
simple nor transparent (Saghir, 2003). Finally, 
it has been argued that bidding processes are 
bureaucratic, have significant transaction costs, 
and are time-consuming for authorities and 
renewable energy developers (Wagner, 2000; 
Goldstein et al, 1999). 
 
2.3.8 Flexibility 
Historically, pricing laws have been criticized 
for being inflexible. For example, once tariffs 
are established, it could be difficult to reduce 
them (Wiser et al, 2000). However, it is 
possible to set up the system such that 
payments can be adjusted on a regular basis to 
reflect changes in technologies and market 
conditions. This flexibility was incorporated 
into the German system in 2000, and is now 
featured in other national pricing systems as 
well. Thus, once a government sets the price to 
be paid for renewably generated electricity, it 
is possible in the future to adjust these 
payments up or down to affect the amount of 
new capacity coming on line as desired.  
 
On the other hand, with a quota system, once 
targets and timetables are established, they are 
difficult to adjust. Even as markets change and 
technologies advance, experiencing major 
breakthroughs in efficiency and/or cost, it is 
highly unlikely that targets or timetables can 
be altered—or, at least made more ambitious—
particularly without lead-times of several 
years.3 
 
2.4 Summary of pricing and quota systems analysis 
The following arguments for and against 
pricing and quota systems are based on the 
above analysis. 
2.4.1 Pricing systems 
Arguments in favor: 
• To date, they have been most successful at 
developing renewables markets and 
domestic industries, and achieving the 
associated social, economic, 
environmental, and security benefits 
• Flexible – can be designed to account for 
changes in technology and the marketplace 
• Encourage steady growth of small- and 
medium-scale producers 
• Low transaction costs 
• Ease of financing 
• Ease of entry. 
Arguments against: 
• If tariffs are not adjusted over time, 
consumers may pay unnecessarily high 
prices for renewable power 
• Can involve restraints on renewable 
energy trade due to domestic production 
requirements. 
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2.4.2 Quota systems 
Arguments in favor: 
• Promote least-cost projects - cheapest 
resources used first, which brings down 
costs early on 
• Provide certainty regarding future market 
share for renewables (often not true in 
practice) 
• Perceived as being more compatible with 
open or traditional power markets 
• More likely to fully integrate renewables 
into electricity supply infrastructure. 
 
Arguments against: 
• High risks and low rewards for equipment 
industry and project developers, which 
slows innovation 
• Price fluctuation in “thin” markets, 
creating instability and gaming 
• Tend to favor large, centralized merchant 
plants and not suited for small investors 
 
 
• Concentrate development in areas with 
best resources, causing possible opposition 
to projects and missing many of the 
benefits associated with renewable energy 
(jobs, economic development in rural 
areas, reductions in local pollution) 
• Targets can set upper limits for 
development – there are no high profits to 
serve as incentives to install more than the 
mandated level because profitability exists 
only within the quota 
• Tends to create cycles of stop-and-go 
development 
• Complex in design, administration and 
enforcement 
• High transaction costs 
• Lack flexibility—difficult to fine-tune or 
adjust in short-term if situations change. 
 
It is still too early to know how successful 
quota systems can be. 
 
2.4.3 Requirements for successful policy 
Pricing law: 
• Ensure regular adjustments of tariffs – 
incremental adjustments built into law 
• Establish tariffs according to technology 
(and location) with input from research 
institutes and renewables industries 
• Provide tariffs for all potential developers, 
including utilities 
• Ensure that tariffs are high enough to 
cover costs and encourage development 
• Guarantee tariffs for long enough time 
period to ensure high enough rate of return 
• Ensure that costs are shared equally across 
country or region 
• Eliminate barriers to grid connection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quota system: 
• Apply to large segment of market 
• Include specific purchase obligations and 
end-dates 
• Establish adequate penalties for non-
compliance, and enforcement 
• Set different bands by technology type 
• Require long-term contracts to reduce 
uncertainty for project developers 
• Establish minimum and maximum 
certificate prices 
• Do not allow time gap between one quota 
and next. 
 
What is most important for both systems is 
political stability, and long-term, credible, 
enforceable and consistent policies. Additional 
requirements for successful implementation—
such as standards, education and stakeholder 
involvement—are discussed below. 
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3. Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy 
Financial incentives reduce the costs of 
renewable energy by lowering the price paid 
for renewable technologies or energy, 
increasing the payment received, or reducing 
the cost of production. They include market 
compensation in the form of tax credits, 
rebates, and payments, which subsidize 
investment in a technology or the production 
of power. Such incentives have been used 
extensively in Europe, Japan, the United 
States, and India—the only developing country 
that has enacted tax credits to date. (See Box 3) 
Long-term, low-interest loans and loan 
guarantees work to reduce the cost of capital. 
And the reduction or elimination of subsidies 
for conventional energy, while not technically 
a subsidy for renewable energy, helps to level 
the playing field so that renewables are better 
able to compete on a cost basis.  
 
3.1 Tax relief 
3.1.1 Investment and production tax credits 
Investment tax credits can cover just the cost 
of a system—such as a wind turbine or solar 
hot water or PV panel, or the full costs of 
installation. They have been used extensively 
for the promotion of water and space heating 
systems based on biomass and geothermal 
energy. They can be helpful early in the 
diffusion of a technology, when costs are still 
high, and/or to encourage their installation in 
off-grid, remote locations. They directly 
reduce the cost of investing in renewable 
energy systems and reduce the level of risk. 
Production tax credits provide tax benefits 
against the amount of energy actually produced 
and fed into the electric grid, or the amount of 
biofuels produced, for example. They increase 
the rate of return and reduce the payback 
period, while rewarding producers for actual 
generation of energy. 
 
To encourage investment in renewables in the 
early 1980s, the U.S. government and state of 
California offered investors credit against their 
income tax. In combination with standard, 
long-term contracts (discussed above in 2.1), 
the credits helped to create a wind boom that 
many people called California’s second gold 
rush. The lessons learned and economies of 
scale gained through this experience advanced 
wind technology and reduced its costs. But the 
combination of enormous tax breaks and a lack 
of technology standards encouraged fraud and 
the use of substandard equipment. (In India, 
too, while investment subsidies for wind 
energy led to large investments in the 1990s, 
there was limited concern about maintenance 
and long-term performance due to a lack of 
standards.) Inexperienced financial companies 
and former shopping center developers flocked 
to the wind business in California, and untested 
designs were rushed into production—all to 
take advantage of credits that enabled wealthy 
investors to recoup anywhere from 66 to 95 
percent of their investment over the first few 
years, in some cases without even generating a 
kilowatt-hour of power. While these early tax 
credits helped to jump-start the wind industry, 
once the credits and fixed prices expired the 
industry collapsed, with ripple effects felt as 
far away as Denmark, and numerous wind 
energy firms went bankrupt. (Sawin, 2001; 
Lauber, 2003)  
 
One of the largest production tax credit 
programs is in the United States. Since 1994, 
the U.S. government has offered a production 
tax credit (PTC) that reduces the income tax 
liability for people who supply wind-generated 
electricity to the grid. The PTC has encouraged 
wind energy development, and has been 
credited with driving significant capacity 
increases in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At 
the same time, the PTC has encouraged 
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development only in those states with 
additional incentives. (Sawin, 2001)  
 
In general, production incentives are preferable 
to investment incentives because they promote 
the desired outcome—generation of electricity 
or other forms of energy. Although investment 
subsidies encourage installation at the optimal 
level for individuals or businesses, they do not 
necessarily result in installation at the optimal 
level for the society or community as a whole. 
Investment incentives encourage the purchase 
of renewable energy systems, but on their own 
they do not necessarily encourage investors to 
purchase the most reliable systems available, 
or to maintain them and produce as much 
energy with them as possible. Another problem 
associated with investment credits is that 
investment in the technologies they are 
designed to support generally declines once the 
credits expire, unless costs have fallen 
sufficiently or other support mechanisms are in 
place. Production incentives, on the other 
hand, are most likely to encourage optimum 
performance and a sustained industry. 
 
However, policies must be tailored to 
particular technologies and stages of 
maturation. Investment subsidies can be 
helpful when a technology is still maturing and 
relatively expensive, as has been the case with 
PVs in Japan, although rebates are a preferable 
means for subsidizing investment (discussed 
below). (Sawin, 2001) Further, investment 
support is often more appropriate for small-
scale renewables such as heat pumps or small-
scale PV because their administrative costs are 
lower—they require a one-time payment rather 
than annual payments based on metered data 
(Kleiburg, 2003). Performance problems 
associated with investment subsidies can be 
overcome by tying investment incentives to 
equipment and performance standards, as long 
as these requirements are enforced. And if 
investment credits are adjustable and/or 
gradually decline over time and phase out as 
technology costs fall, it might be possible to 
avoid the sudden decline in investment that 
often occurs when these subsidies expire. 
 
It is also important to note that tax incentives 
tend to favor one type of entity over another, 
and they provide greater benefit to people with 
higher income levels and tax loads. In addition, 
they are often used as tax loopholes. 
Investment tax credits, in particular, can affect 
the timing of installation as people may make 
investments toward the end of a tax cycle, 
which can negatively affect renewables 
industries. As with investment credits, 
production tax credits should decline over time 
and eventually be phased out. 
3.1.2 Other tax relief 
Other tax related incentives can help promote 
renewable energy development by reducing the 
costs of investment, or by accounting for the 
external benefits of renewable energy. The 
latter include eco- or carbon-tax exemptions. 
The former include accelerated depreciation, 
relief from taxes on sales and property, value-
added tax (VAT) exemptions, and reduction or 
elimination of import duties on renewable 
energy technologies or components. It is 
important to note that import duties increase 
the upfront costs of renewable energy projects, 
and should be significantly reduced if not 
eliminated, at least until a strong domestic 
manufacturing industry can be established.  
 
 
19 
 
 
3.2 Rebates and payments 
As an alternative to production and investment 
credits against taxes, some states and countries 
have subsidized renewable energy through 
production payments or rebates. Rebates are 
refunds of a specific share of the cost of a 
technology, or share of total installation costs 
(for example, 30 percent of total costs), or 
refunds of a certain amount of money per unit 
of capacity installed (for example, $3.00 per 
peak watt (Wp) of PV capacity). As with 
investment credits, rebates are most effective 
when linked to technology and performance 
standards (discussed below). Japan has 
provided investment subsidies through rebates 
for PVs; the rebates in combination with low-
interest loans, public education and net 
metering have led to dramatic success with 
PVs. (See Box 4; see also Chart 2 for examples 
of the impacts of sustained rebates and low-
interest loans on PV markets.)  
 
Production payments reward energy generation 
through a certain payment per unit of output. 
For example, California has enacted a 
production incentive that awards a per kWh 
payment for some existing and new renewable 
energy projects. It is financed through a small 
per kWh charge on electricity use, meaning 
that Californians share the cost of the program 
according to the amount of power they 
consume. (See Box 5) Provided that such 
payments are high enough to cover the costs of 
renewable generation and are guaranteed over 
a long enough time period, this policy 
integrates some key elements of a pricing 
law—similar in effect and perhaps more 
politically feasible in some countries. (Sawin, 
2003)  
 
Experiences to date demonstrate that payments 
and rebates are preferable to tax credits for a 
number of reasons. Unlike tax credits, the 
benefits of payments and rebates are equal for 
people of all income levels. In addition, 
investment grants or rebates result in more 
even growth over time rather than encouraging 
people to invest at the end of tax periods (as 
tax credits tend to do). (Sawin, 2001) Finally, 
at least one analyst believes that there is no 
evidence that either investment or production 
tax credits anywhere have led to a substantial 
increase in market penetration of PV (Haas, 
2002). Clearly, the effects of one single 
instrument are limited. 
 
With regard to rebates, it has been argued that 
they must cover a fixed amount per unit of 
capacity rather than a percentage of investment 
costs, because a fixed rebate encourages 
investors to seek out the most efficient or 
cheapest option (Haas, 2002). And all 
subsidies for investment rather than production 
should be accompanied by standards or 
monitoring programs to ensure good 
performance. It is also important to enact 
subsidies that are flexible and can be adjusted 
up or down as necessary. 
 
3.3 Low-interest loans and loan guarantees 
Worldwide, one of the major barriers to 
renewable technologies is the high initial 
capital costs of renewable energy projects. 
Thus, the cost of borrowing plays a major role 
in the viability of renewable energy markets. 
Financing assistance in the form of low-
interest, long-term loans and loan guarantees 
can play an important role in overcoming this 
obstacle. Lowering the cost of capital can bring 
down the average cost of energy per unit and 
reduce the risk of investment. Germany 
addressed this through long-term, low-interest 
loans offered by major banks and refinanced 
by the federal government. (Twele, 2000) 
Japan and some U.S. states have also 
established low-interest loan programs for 
solar PV and other renewables (Eckhart et al, 
2003). 
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Even in the developing world, all but the very 
poorest people are able and willing to pay for 
reliable energy services, and the rate of on-
time payment is extremely high. But the poor 
also need access to low-cost capital and the 
opportunity to lease systems (Goldemberg, 
2000). The very poorest people will likely need 
targeted subsidies as well (Martinot, 2003). If 
monthly costs of solar energy systems are 
comparable to those for candles and kerosene 
lighting, households should be able to afford to 
substitute them (Martinot, 2003).4 According 
to PV companies in South Africa, Indonesia, 
India and the Dominican Republic, up to 50 
percent of prospective purchasers can afford to 
buy systems if reasonable third-party financing 
is available; otherwise, only 2 to 5 percent can 
buy them (Eckhart et al, 2003). So, the 
availability of financing could increase the use 
of PV in some countries by ten-fold or more. 
The impacts could be similar with other 
renewable technologies as well. To date, 
vendor-supplied credit, micro-credit and 
leasing/rental of renewable systems are still 
mostly untested systems, and the effectiveness 
of various consumer loan models are probably 
country-specific, depending on cultural, 
financial and legal factors. But a number of 
developing countries have had successful 
experiences with lending programs that could 
be transferable to other countries. 
One of the most successful means for 
disseminating household-scale renewable 
technologies in rural China has been through 
local public-private bodies that offer such 
services as technical support, materials sale, 
subsidies, and government loans for locally 
manufactured technology. These bodies 
frequently provide revolving credit, with 
repayment linked to the timing of a 
household’s income stream—for example, 
payments come due after crops have been 
harvested. As a result of this program, more 
than 140,000 small wind turbines, producing 
power for more than a half-million people, 
have been installed in Inner Mongolia—the 
greatest number of household-scale wind 
plants operating anywhere in the world 
(Martinot et al, 2002; Wu, 1995). In India, the 
terms of long-term, low-interest loans vary by 
technology, with the most favorable ones being 
for PVs. Through small-scale lending 
programs, even low-income people are able to 
purchase small systems. In addition, the 
national government has worked to obtain 
bilateral and multilateral funding for large-
scale projects, particularly wind. (MNES, 
2000; CSE, 2002) 
 
3.4 Addressing subsidies and pricing for conventional energy 
Perhaps the most important step governments 
can take to advance renewables and reduce 
cost disparities is to make a comprehensive 
change in their perspective and approach to 
energy policy. Governments must eliminate 
inappropriate, inconsistent, and inadequate 
policies that favor conventional fuels and 
technologies and that fail to recognize the 
social, environmental, and economic 
advantages of renewable energy.  
 
In the mid-1990s, governments worldwide 
were handing out $250–300 billion annually to 
subsidize fossil fuels and nuclear power 
(UNDP, 2000). Since then, several 
transitioning and developing countries have 
reduced energy subsidies significantly, but 
global subsidies for conventional energy 
remain many magnitudes higher than those for 
renewable energy (Geller, 2003). Most of these 
subsidies—80–90 percent by some estimates—
are found in the developing world, where the 
price for energy is often set well below the true 
costs of production and delivery (Martinot 
email, 2002). The International Energy Agency 
found that in eight developing countries, that 
together account for a fourth of the world’s 
energy use, energy subsidies cost $257 billion 
in lost GDP, or the equivalent of about 11 
percent of the nations’ combined annual 
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economic output (OECD/IEA, 1999). Even 
relatively small subsidies in developing 
countries—for kerosene and diesel, for 
example—can discourage the use of renewable 
energy. These subsidies should either be 
gradually eliminated or shifted to wind, solar 
PVs, and other renewable technologies and 
fuels. In industrial and developing countries 
alike, it is important to ensure that the removal 
of subsidies for conventional energy does not 
negatively affect the poor; subsidies must be 
targeted to enable them to transition to 
renewable energy alternatives.  
 
In most cases, it is less a matter of finding new 
money to invest in renewable energy, and more 
a matter of transferring money flows from 
conventional energy to renewables. It is 
estimated that public and private interests 
invest $250-300 billion annually in new energy 
infrastructure; $40-60 billion of this is for rural 
electrification. And more than $1 trillion are 
spent annually on direct energy purchases 
(Goldemberg, 2002). According to another 
estimate, each year hundreds of millions of 
people in the developing world spend about 
$20 billion on makeshift solutions such as 
candles, kerosene lamps, and batteries for 
lighting and to power small appliances. And 
transporting diesel fuel to remote regions in the 
Amazon, for example, can consume two to 
three times as much fuel for every gallon 
delivered (Perlin, 1999). 
 
The International Energy Agency projects that 
$16 trillion will be invested worldwide in 
energy-supply infrastructure between 2001 and 
2030. Nearly 60 percent of this is expected to 
go to the electricity sector (for both power 
generation, and transmission and distribution) 
(IEA, 2003). According to the United Nations, 
investments for new power sector projects in 
the developing world alone are expected to be 
in the range of $50-60 billion annually (UNEP, 
2000). Even small shifts in these expenditures 
and in energy subsidies would have a 
tremendous impact on renewable energy 
markets and industries, although more than a 
small shift is needed. 
 
It is important to recognize that, even if all 
subsidies for fossil fuels and nuclear power 
were removed immediately, existing 
infrastructure in most countries—much of 
which was funded with public money—would 
continue to favor conventional energy. In 
addition, conventional energy benefits from 
hidden or indirect subsidies, including 
obligations to purchase a specific form of 
energy, government investments in grid 
extensions, exemptions from risk or liability, 
and government energy purchases.  
 
As the single largest consumers of energy in 
most, if not all, countries, governments should 
purchase ever-larger shares of energy from 
renewables and install renewable technologies 
on public buildings. This would have a 
significant impact on renewable energy 
markets. In the process, governments would set 
an example, increase public awareness, reduce 
perceived risks associated with renewable 
technologies, and reduce costs through 
economies of scale. 
 
In addition, pricing structures must account for 
the significant external costs of conventional 
energy and the advantages of renewable 
energy, as Germany has begun to do through 
an eco-tax on fossil fuels and the renewable 
electricity tariffs under the Renewable Energy 
Law (feed-in/pricing law) of 2000, and as other 
countries are doing with energy or carbon 
taxes. 
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4. Other Essential Policy Mechanisms 
4.1 Standards 
Another essential ingredient for promoting 
renewable energy is industry standards. There 
are several types of standards: technology 
standards and certification; project siting and 
permitting standards; grid connection 
standards; and building codes. 
 
Standards can prevent inferior technologies 
from entering the marketplace and generate 
greater confidence in a product, thereby 
reducing risks, which is important for 
financing. Technology standards for wind 
turbines, for example, can include everything 
from turbine blades, electronics, and safety 
systems to performance and compatibility with 
the transmissions system. Denmark adopted 
wind turbine standards in 1979, largely due to 
pressure from the wind industry itself. The 
Danish technology standards program, 
combined with the sharing of performance and 
other relevant information among turbine 
owners and manufacturers, has enabled 
manufacturers to recognize and address 
problems with their technologies and to create 
pride in Danish machines. Standards are 
credited with playing a major role in 
Denmark’s rise to become the world’s leading 
turbine manufacturer. (Krohn, 2000a; Madsen, 
2000) Germany established an investment tax 
credit for wind energy in 1991, and while it too 
has been abused as a tax loophole for the 
wealthy, Germany has avoided the quality 
control problems experienced in California and 
India by enacting turbine standards and 
certification requirements. Eventually, 
technology standards for all renewable 
technologies should be established at the 
international level. (Sawin, 2003)  
 
In addition, siting and planning requirements 
can reduce opposition to renewables if they 
address other potential issues of concern, such 
as noise and visual or environmental impacts. 
Such laws can be used to set aside specific 
locations for development or to restrict areas at 
higher risk of environmental damage or injury 
to birds, for example. Both Germany and 
Denmark have required municipalities to 
reserve specific areas for wind turbines and 
have set restrictions on proximity to buildings 
and lakes, among other things. These policies 
have been extremely successful, reducing 
uncertainty about if and where turbines can be 
sited and expediting the planning process. The 
United Kingdom offers the best example of 
how the lack of planning regulations can 
paralyze an industry. Despite having the best 
wind resources in Europe, the nation added 
little wind capacity under its renewables 
obligation regulations (NFFO, discussed 
above), in part because a lack of planning 
regulations virtually halted the process for 
obtaining planning and environmental permits. 
(Sawin, 2001; Madsen, 2002).  
 
Renewables face two challenges when it comes 
to interconnection with the grid. First, unlike 
conventional plants that have flexibility in 
siting, renewable plants must be sited where 
the resources are located. Second, some 
renewables, such as solar and wind, are 
intermittent. Both challenges necessitate the 
creation of fair connection standards and 
charges, and guaranteed access to the grid. 
Interconnection requirements are often overly 
burdensome and inconsistent, which can lead 
to high transaction costs for renewable energy 
project developers, particularly if they must 
hire technical and legal experts. Safety 
requirements are essential, but many utilities 
go beyond that to discourage interconnection 
with relatively small residential or commercial 
systems. For example, utilities can block 
transmission access or charge high prices for 
access to the grid and use of transmission lines 
(Beck and Martinot, 2004). In addition, 
transmission charges on a per capacity basis 
put intermittent renewables at a disadvantage, 
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as they must pay for access even when they are 
not using it, increasing average transmission 
costs per kWh. Thus, it is important that 
governments establish interconnection 
standards under which renewable energy 
developers pay only for the direct costs of 
connection with the grid, not for necessary 
upgrades to carry the additional capacity, and 
only for the transmission service that they 
actually use. Further, because most renewable 
electricity (with the exception of biomass) has 
zero marginal costs (the fuel is free), it should 
always have priority access to the transmission 
system. This makes economic sense, and all 
other sources (that are dispatchable) can easily 
be ramped down as necessary. 
 
Building codes and standards can also be 
designed to promote energy efficiency and 
renewables such as passive solar (transparent 
and opaque insulation), solar thermal energy, 
modern biomass, geothermal and PV by 
requiring that these be incorporated into 
designs and planning processes for residential 
and commercial buildings. In November 2003, 
the London borough of Merton adopted a 
requirement that new non-residential buildings 
larger than 1,000 meters square meet at least 
10 percent of their energy needs with on-site 
renewables such as solar thermal and PV 
(SolarAccess.com, 2003c). Barcelona, Spain 
has adopted an ordinance requiring that new or 
renovated buildings meet 60 percent of their 
energy needs for hot water with solar thermal 
systems, and several other Spanish cities have 
followed suit. Alternatively, a portion of new 
buildings could be required to include wiring 
and other hardware that make them PV- or 
thermal systems-ready, an addition that would 
add little to construction costs in many 
instances, while making it easier and far less 
costly to install PV/solar thermal systems later. 
Depending on climate conditions where 
buildings are sited, the existence of such 
standards can have a significant impact on 
energy requirements, particularly for heating 
and cooling needs. 
 
Furthermore, improving energy efficiency 
facilitates the use of renewable energy for two 
reasons. First, because the scale becomes more 
manageable, renewables can more easily 
satisfy energy needs; second, as the load is 
reduced, it is easier to bear higher costs per 
unit of output. The combination of new 
materials and technologies, natural cooling 
techniques, and passive solar heating and 
lighting, can significantly increase the 
efficiency of buildings. 
 
4.2 Education and information dissemination 
Information dissemination is another key 
policy component. Education and information 
dissemination related to renewable energy 
must include everything from resource studies 
and education about various renewable 
technologies, to training and information about 
available government incentives and support 
systems. 
 
Even if a government offers generous 
incentives and low-cost capital, people will not 
invest in renewable energy if they lack 
information regarding resource availability, 
technology development, the numerous 
advantages and potential applications of 
renewables, the fuel mix of the energy they 
use, and the incentives themselves. During the 
1980s, several U.S. states offered substantial 
subsidies for wind energy—including a 100 
percent tax credit in Arkansas, a state with 
enough wind resources to generate half of its 
electricity (Righter, 1996; Battelle/PNL, 1991). 
But these subsidies evoked little interest due to 
a lack of knowledge about wind resources. By 
contrast, it was wind resource studies in 
California, Hawaii, and Minnesota that led to 
interest in wind energy in these states. And 
cloudy Germany has more solar water heaters 
than the sunnier countries of Spain and France, 
greatly because public awareness of the 
technology is so much higher in Germany 
(Hua, 2002).  
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Lack of experience or past experiences—from 
failed Californian wind projects in the 1980s to 
early development projects in Africa—have 
left people in much of the world with a 
perception that renewables do not work, are 
inadequate to meet their needs, are too 
expensive, or are too risky as investments. 
Above all, it is essential that government 
leaders recognize the inherent value of 
renewable energy. Then governments, non-
governmental organizations, and industry must 
work together to educate labor organizations 
about employment benefits, architects and city 
planners about ways to incorporate renewables 
into building projects and their value to local 
communities, agricultural communities about 
their potential to increase farming incomes, 
and so on. In India, the government’s Solar 
Finance Capacity Building Initiative educates 
Indian bank officials about solar technologies 
and encourages them to invest in projects. The 
Indian government has also used print media, 
radio, songs, and theater to educate the public 
about the benefits of renewable energy and 
government incentives, and has established 
training programs. (MNES, 2000) In Austria, 
students learn about renewable energy in 
schools and universities, and in Germany many 
vocational training programs cover renewable 
energy issues (Goldstein et al, 1999; BMU, 
1994).  
 
It is often assumed that barriers and solutions 
to renewables are unique to particular countries 
or settings, but this is not necessarily the case 
(Kammen, 1999). At the local, national, and 
international levels, it is essential to share 
information regarding technology performance 
and cost, capacity and generation statistics, and 
policy successes and failures in order to 
increase awareness and to avoid reinventing 
the wheel each time. While several countries 
now do this on a national level, a centralized 
global clearinghouse for such information is 
clearly needed.  
 
 
4.3 Public ownership and stakeholder involvement 
Public ownership and/or participation are also 
essential for the success of specific projects, as 
well as the development of effective renewable 
energy policies. Germany’s renewable energy 
law of 2000 was designed in cooperation with 
research institutes and the renewables 
industries, and the U.S. state of California has 
designed recent renewable energy programs 
with stakeholder input provided at public 
workshops. 
 
In Germany and Denmark, where individuals 
singly or as members of cooperatives still own 
most of the turbines installed, there is strong 
and broad public support for wind energy. 
Farmers, doctors, and many others own 
turbines or shares of wind farms, and stand 
beside labor and environmental groups in 
backing policies that support wind power. As 
of 2002, about 85 percent of the installed wind 
capacity in Denmark was established through 
local initiatives and owned by farmers or 
cooperatives, and at least 340,000 Germans 
had invested about €12 billion in renewable 
energy projects (PREDAC, 2002/03). The 40 
MW Middelgrunden project off the coast of 
Copenhagen is co-owned by a utility and 
several thousand Danes who have purchased 
shares in the project (EWEA/Greenpeace, 
2002). Construction costs of the world’s 
largest roof-mounted PV plant, which opened 
in Munich, Germany in November 2002, were 
financed by interested citizens eager to invest 
in renewable energy (Maycock, 2003).5 
 
Through cooperatives, people share in the risks 
and benefits of renewable projects; often avoid 
the problems associated with obtaining 
financing and paying interest; play a direct role 
in the siting, planning, and operation of 
machines; and gain a sense of pride and 
community (Sawin, 2001). Several surveys 
have demonstrated that those who own shares 
of projects and those living closest to wind 
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turbines view wind power more positively than 
those who have no economic interest or 
experience with it (Damborg and Krohn, 
1998). Local investment also provides an 
opportunity to strengthen and diversify local 
economies, particularly in rural areas, and can 
lead to new projects through the sharing of 
information and relevant experiences 
(PREDAC, 2002/03).   
 
Public participation and a sense of ownership 
are as important in the South as in the North. 
When technologies are “forced” on people 
without consultation regarding their needs or 
desires or are donated as part of an aid 
package, people often place little value on 
them and do not feel they have a stake in 
maintaining them. On the flip side, when 
individuals and communities play a role in 
decision making and ownership, they are 
literally empowered and become invested in 
the success of the technologies. The key to 
success of some projects in developing 
countries has been a sense of ownership among 
local people. For example, local participation 
and ownership of solar mini-grid projects in 
Nepal and the Indian islands of Sundarbans, 
have played a crucial role in the success of 
projects and have eliminated electricity theft 
(BBC News, 2003). 
 
5. Importance of Consistent, Long-term Policies 
It is important to note that policies enacted to 
advance renewable energy can slow the 
transition if they are not well formulated or are 
inconsistent, piecemeal, or unsustained. For 
example, because early investment credits in 
the U.S. state of California were short-lived 
and extensions were often uncertain, many 
equipment manufacturers could not begin mass 
production for fear that credits would end too 
soon (CEC, 1982). When incentives expired, 
interest waned and the industries and markets 
died with them. In the case of wind power, the 
impact was felt as far away as Denmark, which 
relied on the California market for sales of 
Danish turbines. The U.S. Production Tax 
Credit for wind energy has been allowed to 
expire several times, only to be extended 
months later. As a result, the credit has 
stimulated wind capacity growth but has 
created cycles of boom and bust in the market. 
Such cycles lead to suspension of projects, 
worker lay-offs, and loss of momentum in the 
industry. 
 
This on-and-off approach to renewables has 
caused significant uncertainties, bankruptcies, 
and other problems and has made the 
development of a strong industry in the United 
States a challenge, at best. Indeed, the United 
States is the only country to have seen a 
decline in total wind generating capacity over 
the last decade (Gipe, 1998). In India, 
uncoordinated, inconsistent state policies and 
bottlenecks imposed by state electricity boards 
have acted as barriers to renewables 
development (CSE, 2002). Even in Denmark, 
years of successful wind energy growth ended 
in 1999 when the government changed course, 
and uncertainty overtook years of investor 
confidence. The future of some planned 
offshore wind farms is now uncertain, as is 
Denmark’s target to produce half its electricity 
with wind by 2030 (Møller, 2002), and the 
number of jobs in the domestic industry is now 
in decline (BWE, 2003a). (See Chart 3 for 
impacts of inconsistency, and policy types, on 
annual wind installations in Germany, the 
United States and Spain.) 
 
Consistent policy environments are necessary 
for the health of all industries. Consistency is 
critical for ensuring continuous growth and 
stability in the market, enabling the 
development of a domestic manufacturing 
industry, reducing the risk of investing in a 
technology, and making it easier to obtain 
financing. It is also cheaper. (Sawin, 2001) 
With stop-and-go policies, each time around 
the funds must be appropriated, a new program 
must be administered, information must be 
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distributed to stakeholders, and so on. As a 
result, costs of administering the program 
could approach those of the incentives 
themselves (Uh, 2003).  
 
Clearly, government commitment to develop 
renewable energy markets and industries must 
be strong, and long-term, with a clear intent to 
advance these technologies, just as it has been 
with fossil fuels and nuclear power. 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
For renewable energy to reach its full 
potential—to make as large as possible a 
contribution to economic development and job 
creation, improving domestic energy security 
and reducing oil dependence, and reducing the 
health and environmental impacts of energy 
production and consumption—it is essential to 
create the conditions that allow for 
development of sustained markets and 
industries which, in turn, will result in 
increased renewable capacity and generation, 
and will drive down costs.  
 
To date, feed-in—or pricing systems have been 
responsible for most of the additions in 
renewable energy capacity and generation, 
while also driving down costs through 
technology advancement and economies of 
scale, and developing domestic industries and 
jobs. Pricing systems, where well-
implemented, have provided increased 
predictability and consistency in markets, 
which in turn has encouraged banks and other 
financial institutions to provide the capital 
required for investment, and has attracted 
private investment for R&D. The record of 
quota systems is more uneven thus far. Quota 
systems, if designed well, have the potential to 
work effectively. But they are harder to get 
right and have a tendency to lead to stop and 
go, and boom and bust markets. Once 
renewable electricity markets and industries 
are well-established, and renewables can 
compete favorably with conventional energy, 
quota systems will likely be the most 
appropriate means for furthering the 
development and use of renewable energy 
technologies.  
 
A combination of policies is required, whether 
for grid-connected electricity or other uses, 
including production-based incentives and 
financing support to lower initial investment 
costs and reduce risk, whether real or 
perceived. Ultimately, the effectiveness of 
policies in promoting renewable energy will 
depend on their design, enforcement, how well 
they address needs and national circumstances, 
and the extent to which they are reliable and 
sustained. Long-term, consistent and clear 
government commitment to renewable energy 
is imperative. 
 
Following are recommendations for policies to 
advance a range of renewable energy 
technologies. Additional recommendations that 
are specific to developing countries are 
discussed in Box 6.  
 
•   Establish regulatory frameworks 
needed to provide access to relevant markets 
and favorable climates for investment, such 
as well-designed quota or pricing systems 
for grid-connected renewable electricity. 
Recommendations specific to pricing and 
quota systems are listed in section 2.4.3. 
 
• Provide net metering for small-scale 
renewable systems (California provides net 
metering for systems up to 1 MW) where 
pricing laws are not in use. Time-of-use 
metering should be implemented for PVs. 
 
• Provide financing assistance to 
reduce costs through production payments 
(rather than tax credits) for more-advanced 
technologies, and long-term, low-interest 
loans with investment rebates (rather than 
tax credits) for more-expensive technologies 
and/or those that are off-grid such as solar 
PV. Investment incentives should always be 
27 
 
 
tied to technology and/or production 
standards. It can also be useful to require 
reporting of operational data for subsidized 
projects on a regular basis. Regarding 
rebates, a fixed amount per unit of capacity 
might be preferable to a percentage of 
investment costs for encouraging the most 
efficient and least-cost options, and thus for 
reducing costs. All subsidies must be “smart 
subsidies” that gradually phase out over 
time—subsidies are not likely to lead to 
sustainable markets unless they help create 
the conditions in which they eventually are 
not needed.  
 
• Be careful if setting capacity limits 
on large-scale projects in the context of 
financing assistance and quota or pricing 
laws. At a minimum, capacity restrictions 
should allow for project sizes that can 
achieve cost reductions through scale 
economies; otherwise, they can discourage 
development of some renewable resources. 
When capacity restrictions are necessary, 
they might be addressed better under siting 
regulations, with variations by region and 
technology where appropriate. 
 
• Research, educate and disseminate 
information regarding resource availability, 
the benefits and potential of renewable 
energy, capacity and generation statistics, 
government incentives (for renewable and 
conventional energy), and policy successes 
and failures on local, national, and 
international levels. Establish a centralized 
global clearinghouse for such information. 
And establish national training programs in 
vocational schools, universities and other 
appropriate institutions. Provide information 
at all levels of education (from primary 
schools to universities) about the potential 
and benefits of renewable energy, state of the 
technologies, and other relevant issues. 
 
 
 
• Encourage stakeholder/public 
ownership and participation in renewables 
policy formulation and in project planning 
and decision making. Citizen involvement 
can be critical to project development and 
viability, while introducing the concepts of 
democracy and self-determination to the 
process of energy procurement. 
 
• Establish standards for technology 
performance, safety, and siting, and create or 
strengthen building codes to improve 
efficiencies and encourage the integration of 
renewable technologies into structures. 
Standards must also be set for grid 
connection to eliminate burdensome utility 
interconnection requirements and charges. 
  
• Incorporate external costs and 
benefits of energy technologies and fuels in 
pricing structures and consider them when 
developing policy objectives. In addition to 
environmental, health and employment 
benefits, considerations should include 
factors such as reliability and security 
benefits associated with modular, 
distributed, and smaller-scale renewable 
technologies, the reduced risk of fuel price 
volatility, and benefits of a more diversified 
(and domestic) portfolio of energy options. 
 
• Shift government subsidies from 
conventional to renewable energies, in line 
with previous point. 
 
• Increase government procurement 
of renewable energy. Governments should 
purchase ever-larger shares of energy from 
renewables and install renewable 
technologies on public buildings and in 
public spaces (where appropriate) to set an 
example, increase public awareness, reduce 
perceived risks associated with renewable 
technologies, and reduce costs through 
learning and economies of scale.  
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The devil is in the details, and certain types of 
policies can be successful or not depending on 
how they are implemented. For any of the 
above policies to be effective, they must be: 
 
• Predictable, long-term and 
consistent, with clear government intent. 
These characteristics are critical to provide 
certainty in the market to draw investors into 
the industry, and to provide enough lead-
time to allow industries and markets to 
adjust to change. 
 
• Appropriate. The right types of 
support are needed—policies must match 
objectives and might vary by resource 
potentials, location, technology type, and 
timing. It is also important that the level of 
support not be too high or too low. 
 
• Flexible. It is essential to design 
policies such that adjustments (fine-tuning, 
but not wholesale changes or elimination of 
policies) can be made on a regular, pre-
determined time schedule if circumstances 
change. Governments must be able to 
address existing barriers as they become 
apparent, and new barriers as they arise. 
Policies also must be designed to allow 
developers/generators flexibility for meeting 
government mandates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Credible and enforceable. If policies 
are not credible, or are not enforceable (or 
enforced), there will be little incentive to 
abide by them. 
 
• Clear and Simple. Policies must be 
easy to implement, understand, and comply 
with. Procedures of permission and 
administration, where necessary, must be as 
clear and simple as possible. 
 
• Transparent. Transparency is 
important for suppliers and consumers of 
energy and is necessary to avoid abuse. It 
facilitates enforcement, maximizes 
confidence in policies, and helps ensure that 
mechanisms are open and fair. 
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7. Boxes 
 
Box 1: Ethanol in Brazil  
 
About 180 million people live in countries that mandate the mixing of ethanol with petrol, and more 
than two thirds of the world’s ethanol is consumed in Brazil (Martinot, 2003). In fact, modern biomass 
provides about 20 percent of Brazil’s primary energy supply, and much of this is due to the use of 
alcohol fuels (Martinot et al, 2002).  
 
In 1975, the Brazilian National Alcohol Program (PROÁLCOOL) was established in response to the 
first oil crisis, to reduce oil imports and avoid an economic downturn. The program required that all 
oil be blended with alcohol (ethanol), with the exact share regulated through government decree, 
generally between 20 and 24 percent.6 The government also promoted the manufacture and sale of cars 
that run on 100 percent ethanol, and provided subsidies to increase sugar cane production and the 
construction of distilleries. Infrastructure was developed to distribute ethanol to thousands of pumping 
stations around the country (de Hollanda and Poole, undated). Alcohol vehicle sales soared and 
reached a high of 96 percent of total sales in the mid-1980s (de Andrade et al, 1998). 
 
A decline in oil prices and the 1989 ethanol shortage combined to reduce purchases of all-alcohol cars; 
they came crashing down to 0.03 percent of total vehicle sales by 1997 (de Andrade et al, 1998). But 
sales are again on the rise in response to new tax breaks in alcohol producing regions and required 
government “green fleets” (Khalip and Blackburn, 2002). Energy security concerns are revitalizing 
PROÁLCOOL—Brazil must now import 40 to 50 percent of the oil it consumes, despite its significant 
petroleum reserves (US DOE, 2002; Coelho, 2002). Brazil is now testing other combinations of fuels 
for blending, including methane, vegetable oils, and hydrogen. In addition, the country is now 
developing a national biodiesel program—starting with 5 percent quotas, with a long-term goal of 20 
percent by 2020—to reduce dependence on imported diesel and to lower pollution levels (Pekic, 
2003). 
 
Since the introduction of Brazil’s ethanol program in 1975, the cost of producing ethanol has declined 
by 4-5 percent annually (Woods and Hall, undated). Even without subsidies, which were eliminated in 
the late 1990s, ethanol is now cheaper per unit of energy than gasoline (Goldemberg, 2002; Khalip and 
Blackburn, 2002). The ethanol program has opened up much of Brazil, creating more than a million 
jobs—for 40 percent of the rural labor force, and reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions to 20 percent 
below what they would be otherwise (Panik, need date; CO2e.com, 2002).7 About 4 million cars 
continue to run solely on alcohol, and the sales of all-alcohol cars doubled in early 2002 (Coelho et al, 
1999; Khalip and Blackburn, 2002). It has been estimated that Brazil’s savings from avoided fuel 
imports over the past 27 years exceed $52 billion, many times the total investments in the agricultural 
and industry sectors for ethanol production for vehicle use (Goldemberg et al, 2003). Brazil is now an 
exporter of ethanol fuel, soon to be exporting its technologies as well (Khalip and Blackburn, 2002).  
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Box 2: Germany and the Feed-in/Pricing Law 
 
When the 1990s began, Germany had virtually no renewable energy industry and, in the view of most 
Germans, the country was unlikely ever to be in the forefront of these alternative energy sources. Yet, 
by the end of the decade, Germany had transformed into a renewable energy leader, with a new, 
multibillion-dollar industry and tens of thousands of new jobs.  
 
Driven by growing public concerns about the safety of nuclear power, the security of energy supply, 
and environmental impacts including global climate change, the German government passed a new 
energy law in 1990 that required utilities to purchase the electricity generated from all renewable 
technologies in their supply area, and to pay a minimum price for it—at least 90 percent in the case of 
wind and solar power. The “Electricity Feed-in Law” was inspired in part by similar policies that had 
proved effective in neighboring Denmark.  
 
The law has been adjusted numerous times since it entered into force in 1991. Most significantly, in 
2000, the German Bundestag required that renewable electricity be distributed among all suppliers 
based on their total electricity sales, ensuring that no one region would be overly burdened. Additional 
technologies, such as geothermal power, were included under the new law (Sanner and Bussmann, 
2003). And, with help from scientific input and the various renewable industries, the Bundestag 
established specific per kilowatt-hour payments for each renewable technology based on the real costs 
of generation. Electric utilities also qualify for these tariffs, a change that the government correctly 
expected would reduce utility opposition while further stimulating the renewable energy market. 
(Gerdes, 2000) 
 
Soon after the first pricing law was established, wind energy (but wind only) development in Germany 
began a steady and dramatic surge, and farmers, small investors, and start-up manufacturers began to 
create a new industry from scratch. Some barriers to renewables remained; as each new hurdle arose, 
the government enacted laws or established programs to address them. Obstacles to wind included 
lengthy, inconsistent and complex siting procedures. The government responded by encouraging 
communities to zone specific areas for wind. As of 2000, grid operators must connect plants at the 
most suitable location and pay for necessary upgrading, eliminating barriers that arose when utilities 
discouraged wind development through inflated connection-related charges (Lackmann, 2002).  
 
Germany addressed the challenge of high initial capital costs of renewable energy through low-interest 
loans offered by major banks and refinanced by the federal government, and through the introduction 
of PV-specific tariffs in the 2000 pricing law (Twele, 2000). The “100,000 Roofs” program, which 
expired in 2003 (and has since been replaced with higher PV tariffs), provided 10-year low-interest 
loans for PV installation. Income tax credits granted only to projects and equipment that meet 
specified standards have enabled people to take tax deductions against their investments in renewable 
energy projects. In addition, the federal and state governments have funded renewable resource studies 
on- and off-shore, have established institutes to collect and publish data, and have advanced awareness 
about renewable technologies through publications of subsidies and through architectural, engineering 
and other relevant vocational training programs. (Mayer, 2001; DEWI, 1998; BMU, 1994) 
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All of these policies have played an important role, but the pricing law has had the greatest impact on 
Germany’s renewable energy industries. It ended uncertainties regarding whether producers could sell 
their electricity into the grid and at what price, and provided investor confidence, making it easier for 
even small producers to obtain bank loans, and drawing money into the industries. Increased 
investment drove improvements in technology, advanced learning and experience, and produced 
economies of scale that have led to dramatic cost reductions. The average cost of manufacturing wind 
turbines in Germany fell by 43 percent between 1990 and 2000, and the cost of total PV systems has 
declined 39 percent over the past decade (Wagner, 2002; Weiss and Sprau, 2002). 
 
German wind capacity mushroomed from 56 MW in early 1991 to 12,001 MW at the end of 2002, and 
Germany became the world’s leading wind energy producer in 1997. By the end of 2002, wind energy 
met 4.7 percent of Germany’s total electricity demand, up from 3 percent the previous year (Reuters, 
2003). Cumulative PV installations climbed from just under 6 MW in 1992 to nearly 280 MW at the 
end of 2002 (PVPS, 2003); by late 2003, they were approaching 400 MW (SolarAccess.com, 2003). In 
2001, Germany’s PV capacity surpassed that of the United States, and is now second only to Japan. 
Germany accounts for most of Europe’s PV production and installed capacity, 35.5 percent (as of 
2001) of its biogas capacity, and has the largest solar thermal water heating market in the EU (French, 
2003; SolarAccess.com, 2003b). Some 45,000 people worked in Germany’s wind industry by early 
2003; one fifth of them were hired the previous year (BWE, 2003). And it is estimated that the 
100,000 Roofs program created 10,000 new jobs, at a cost of  €24,000 per position (Platts, 2003). So 
many Germans are employed in renewables industries, or own shares in wind turbines, solar or other 
projects that there is now broad public support for renewable energy. Germany has pledged to reduce 
its CO2 emissions 21 percent below 1990 levels by 2010, and the nation will accomplish much of this 
through increased use of renewable energy. To date, renewable energy is responsible for 50 million 
tons—or 6.25 percent—of Germany’s total CO2 emissions reductions (Uh, 2004). 
 
32 
 
 
 
Box 3: Renewable Energy in India 
 
The Indian state of Tamil-Nadu began assessing its wind resource potential in the mid-1980s. The 
state utility soon built demonstration projects, the necessary grid infrastructure, and provided 
information about good wind sites to potential investors (TERI, 2003). In 1991, the Indian government 
opened the electric grid to private producers, allowing them to build and operate power plants, and to 
enter into long-term contracts with state electricity boards (Osafo and Martinot, 2003). For the first 
time, private companies could produce wind power in remote regions with good resources, and 
“wheel” it over transmission lines for their own needs or for sale to third parties. This access to the 
transmission system, combined with investment tax credits, financing assistance and accelerated 
depreciation, led to a wind energy boom in India, and in Tamil-Nadu in particular.  
 
Today India has the world’s largest wind resource assessment program. Long-term low-interest loans, 
provided through the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA), have attracted private 
funding and encouraged banks to fund renewable energy projects. In fact, the private sector has 
contributed 96 percent of the investment in wind energy to date. (TERI, 2003) The government has 
also made it easy to establish joint ventures with foreign companies, and the subsidies and demand for 
power have drawn major wind companies to India from Germany and Denmark (Watts, 2003). 
 
As in California during the 1980s, investment-based subsidies and a lack of turbine standards or 
production requirements led wealthy investors to use wind farms as tax shelters, and several early 
projects experienced poor performance. This occurred despite significant technology advancements 
that had taken place since the early 1980s. And wind energy growth slowed considerably when 
investment credits declined. Despite some bumps in the road, India now ranks fifth in the world for 
wind energy capacity, with 1,870 MW as of early 2003 (MNES, 2003). India’s turbine manufacturing 
capability is now about 500 MW a year, and 15 companies are involved in the industry, building 
turbines for domestic use and export, and creating local jobs (TERI, 2003a; Chaurey, 2003; Martinot, 
2002). In 2003, certification of design and performance became mandatory, reducing if not eliminating 
concerns about substandard technologies (TERI, 2003a). 
 
There are still challenges to overcome. Policies are inconsistent from state to state, and many states do 
not follow MNES guidelines for grid interfacing, wheeling charges, length of power purchase 
contracts, and tariffs (TERI, 2003a). Commercial demand for renewables remains relatively low, and 
most manufacturers and suppliers are small players with limited resources. In addition, tariffs 
discourage the installation of off-grid, remote projects, and most Indians, particularly those living in 
peri-urban and rural areas, do not have access to financing (Shekhar et al, 2001; Babu and 
Michaelowa, 2003). Import duties, as well, have made it more costly to develop renewable energy 
projects—in the mid-1990s, India was the world’s largest market for PVs, but had some of the highest 
PV prices in the world because of high import duties (McPhee, 1996; World Bank/IEA, 1997). 
 
At the same time, India has made some remarkable achievements. In addition to its success with wind 
energy, India has the world’s largest decentralized solar energy program, and the world’s second 
largest biogas and improved-cookstoves program (MNES, 2002). The Indian government established a 
number of financial incentives for PVs in the 1980s, and set up local service centers and shops as 
market volumes increased. While government subsidies are still essential for most PV installations in 
India, the nation ranks fifth worldwide for grid-connected PV capacity (Martinot et al, 2002; MNES, 
2003). Annual turnover of the renewable energy industry now exceeds 30,000 million Rupees (about 
US$660 million) (Chaurey, 2003). (See Table 2) 
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Box 4: PVs in Japan 
 
Japan established net metering for PV in 1992, requiring utilities to purchase excess power at the retail 
rate. Between April 2001 and March 2002 alone, Japanese electric power companies bought more than 
124 GWh of surplus PV power (PVPS, 2003a). 
 
In 1994, Japan launched the “Solar Roofs” program to promote PVs through low-interest loans, a 
comprehensive education and awareness program, and rebates for grid-connected residential systems 
that were provided in return for data about systems operations. Government promotion of PV has 
included publicity on television and in print media (PVPS, 2003a). The rebates declined gradually 
over time, from 50 percent of installed costs in 1994 to 12 percent in 2002, the year the program 
ended. In 1997, the rebates were opened to owners and developers of housing complexes as well, and 
Japan became the world’s largest supporter of PVs with a seven-fold increase in funding for the 
expanded “70,000 Roofs Program.”  (Haas, 2002; Moore and Ihle, 1999)  
 
The goal of Japan’s PV program was to create market awareness and stimulate PV production in order 
to reduce costs through economies of scale and technology improvements, and thereby enable large-
scale power generation and the export of PVs to the rest of the world. And the policy has succeeded.  
 
Japan is now the world’s leader in the manufacture and use of solar PV, having surpassed the United 
States at both in the late 1990s. When “Solar Roofs” ended, the program had exceeded its objectives; 
more than 420 MW of PV were installed between 1994 and 2002 (Maycock, 2003a). Total installed 
capacity has increased an average of more than 42 percent annually since 1992 (PVPS, 2003). To keep 
up with demand, Japanese PV manufacturers have dramatically increased their production capacity, by 
nearly 47 percent in 2002 alone (Maycock, 2003a). Japan was responsible for more than 43 percent of 
global PV production in 2002, and Sharp is now the world’s leading producer of solar cells (Maycock, 
2003a; Moore and Ihle, 1999). (See Chart 4) By some accounts, PV system costs in Japan have 
dropped at least 75 percent since the mid-1990s, far more rapidly than the decrease in average global 
module costs; according to Maycock, the cost of residential grid-connected systems in Japan declined 
by more than 40 percent between 1995 and 2003 (EPVA/Greenpeace, 2001; Flavin, 2003; Maycock, 
2003a).  
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Box 5: Public Benefit Funds and Bond Initiatives 
 
Fifteen U.S. states now have public benefit funds (PBFs)—accounts created to finance electricity-
related programs to benefit the public, including renewable energy projects, energy efficiency, R&D, 
and low-income assistance. PBFs are funded through a small per kWh surcharge on electricity 
consumption (averaging 0.2-0.3 percent of the retail electric rate (Kittler, 2003)).  
 
The state of California has the largest fund by far, created in 1996 as part of the state’s electricity 
restructuring legislation with a promise of $540 million for renewable energy. More money has been 
added since then, and the program extended to 2012. Existing and new renewable energy projects can 
receive production payments of up to 1.5¢/kWh, with funds allocated through an auction (bids are 
ranked in order of lowest incentive request to highest). The California Energy Commission projects 
that an additional 750 MW of new capacity will be on line by the end of 2003, as a result of this New 
Renewable Resources Account.  
 
California also provides rebates (up to 1.5¢/kWh) for consumers who buy certified green electricity, 
and for investors in “emerging renewables” (PVs, small-scale wind, solar thermal electric, and fuel 
cells powered with renewable hydrogen). People who purchase small wind or PV systems, for 
example, have been able to choose between a rebate of $4.50/W or a 15 percent investment tax credit, 
whichever is less (CEC, 2003).8  
 
The state’s PV program has led to significant growth in PV markets, and in the number of 
manufacturing, distribution and installation companies in California (Lamb, 2003). Since 1998, the 
Emerging Renewables Program has helped to reduce PV system costs by 50 percent. More than 80 
percent of California’s 50 MW of grid-connected PV capacity has been installed since 2000, with at 
least another 5-10 MW expected in 2003. (SolarAccess.com, 2003a) California is the third largest PV 
market in the world, with ten times more installed PV capacity than any other U.S. state (CEC, 2003). 
 
Another program driving PV in California is the San Francisco Solar Bond Initiative. In 2001, the 
city’s voters overwhelming approved a $100 million bond program to purchase renewable energy for 
public facilities. A combination of bulk purchasing and bundling of PV with wind energy and energy 
efficiency measures means that energy savings will pay for the additional costs associated with PV. 
The initiative grew out of concerns about climate change, air pollution and dependence on foreign 
energy sources. The program aims to increase public awareness, create jobs, drive down the costs of 
PV through economies of scale, and to make the city a world leader in the use of clean energy. Several 
other U.S. cities and states are considering following San Francisco’s lead (Vote Solar, 2003; 
Mayfield, 2003). 
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Box 6: Policies for Developing Countries 
 
In developing countries it is essential to bring down the costs of renewable energy, increase 
confidence and awareness, attract investment, build local capacity, and develop supporting 
infrastructure (i.e., legal and regulatory systems, transport and communications) (Wilkins, 2002). At 
least for the short run, sustainable and replicable business models, and consistent and growing markets 
for renewable energy, are more important than quantity. Perhaps the most critical factors for achieving 
these goals are consistent, long-term policies and a clear government commitment to renewable 
energy. 
 
For grid-connected electricity, developing countries face many obstacles and policy options similar to 
those in industrial countries. The keys to development include creation of a favorable investment 
climate that provides long-term stable tariffs, and a regulatory framework for independent power 
producers that provides open grid access with fair transmission charges, and permits wheeling. Such 
factors have helped to catalyze the wind industry in India, and small hydropower in Brazil (Martinot, 
2002; Martinot et al, 2002). While experience with them is very limited in the developing world, a few 
countries have begun to implement quota (China and India) and pricing systems (Brazil) to provide the 
necessary regulatory frameworks. Financing is also crucial, as are production-based incentives to 
encourage optimal performance and sustainability (Martinot et al, 2002). Ultimately, large and 
expanding domestic industries are necessary to overcome regulatory, technical, contractual and 
operational challenges (Martinot, 2002).  
 
Success stories for off-grid electricity programs are still limited, but there are examples of programs 
that have succeeded in providing electricity for rural areas through mini-grids. For instance, 
Argentina’s government offers concessions through which the winning company gains a monopoly in 
a given region, and the government provides grants to cover lifecycle costs. Benefits of this system 
include creation of a large market to provide critical mass for commercially sustainable business and 
to reduce unit costs through scale economies (for equipment, transactions, operation and 
maintenance), as well as its appeal to large companies that have their own sources of funding (Reiche 
et al, 2000). This system has been duplicated in several other countries, including Cape Verde, Togo, 
Benin, and South Africa (Osafo and Martinot, 2003; Reiche et al, 2000). The Philippines and 
Bangladesh have networks of consumer-owned and -managed cooperatives that receive financial 
incentives in exchange for meeting annual performance targets and providing electricity to members 
and the local community. Results have been mixed in both countries (Osafo and Martinot, 2003). 
 
The Chinese government has undertaken an ambitious program to electrify—with mini-grids—more 
than 1,000 townships within 20 months, beginning with township “seats,” followed by an additional 
20,000 administrative villages. Nearly 30 percent of the total funds ($340 million) are earmarked for 
institutional development and training, which will focus on certifying Master Trainers who will then 
instruct others on a local basis. (Ku et al, 2003) 
 
For rural markets, whether for electrification or other needs, there are four key dimensions to 
entrepreneurship (Martinot et al, 2002). Marketing can be challenging and expensive, particularly in 
rural areas, and is discussed further below. Business financing is necessary to overcome the barrier of 
up-front costs for small dealers. Financing can be more difficult to obtain in remote areas, particularly 
if bankers lack knowledge of renewable energy, and interest rates are often extremely high. 
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Possible solutions include partnering with larger dealers, micro-finance lending, and partial credit 
guarantees (Reiche et al, 2000). Bundling of renewables with existing products can reduce costs. And 
a policy framework for rural electrification is essential—for example, the primary barriers to 
renewable energy are often unrealistic promises of grid access and subsidies for kerosene (Martinot et 
al, 2002).  
 
A relatively high density of projects is also required to support the establishment of local businesses 
with trained technicians, which also necessitates that renewable technologies be affordable for 
consumers. Microcredit, leasing and prepaid meters are the most promising options to date (Reiche et 
al, 2000). China offers revolving credit, with repayment linked to timing of a household’s income 
stream. India provides low-interest loans that vary by technology, with the most favorable terms 
available for PV. For the poorest populations, additional subsidies may be needed as well (Reiche et 
al, 2000). 
 
Some key recommendations from the literature about renewable energy in developing countries 
include the following (note that there are several additional and relevant recommendations in Chapter 
6 that are not incorporated below): 
 
• Support should focus on institutions rather than individual projects, as project-specific funding 
tends to create cycles of boom and bust and does not generally build institutional capacity 
(Kammen, 1999). 
• Distorting subsidies should be reduced or eliminated. Subsidies that remain must be carefully 
targeted to those who truly need them. For example, the Argentinian government subsidizes 
minimum rural household electricity consumption of 10 kWh/month; beyond that level there is no 
support (Reiche et al, 2000). 
• Marketing assistance is essential in the early phases. Local governments played a significant role 
in Argentina by preparing detailed market studies, disseminating information, and preparing 
studies regarding reliability of DC appliances to help overcome barriers created by a lack of 
awareness and high marketing costs (Reiche et al, 2000). 
• Develop the capacity for local regulation and certification. Poor production quality can result from 
a lack of standards. 
• Ease import procedures and eliminate or reduce import duties for renewable technologies and 
components to reduce project costs and time delays. 
• Remove barriers to joint-ventures with foreign companies, as India has done. 
• Encourage local production, which provides jobs, local investment, and significantly reduces costs 
of renewable energy technologies. One option for promoting local production is to provide 
purchase subsidies for locally manufactured technologies (Martinot, 2003). 
• Bundling can be used to attract bi- and multilateral financing assistance, as India has done. 
China’s “Brightness program” is funded jointly by China’s Finance Ministry and the German 
state-owned development bank (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau). 
• Government procurement of renewable energies can help achieve a sustainable market and 
industry, while increasing public awareness and reducing perceived risk. Government and national 
utilities can also incorporate solar home systems, for example, into rural electrification planning 
(Reiche et al, 2000). 
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8. Charts and Tables 
Chart 1: World’s Top Wind Turbine Suppliers, 2002 
Top Wind Suppliers by Country, 2002
Rest of 
World
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Calculated w ith data from BTM Consult ApS, March 2003  
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Chart 2: Annual PV Capacity Additions in Japan, the United States and Germany 
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(Source: IEA – PVPS)  
Note that much of the US growth in recent years has been in California.
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Chart 3: Annual Wind Capacity Additions (net) in Germany, the United States and Spain: The 
Importance of Consistent Policy 
Annual Wind Power Capacity Additions in Germany, U.S. & Spain (MW)
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(Sources: BWE, EWEA, AWEA, Paul Gipe, BTM Consult, IDAE) 
 
Chart 4: World’s Top PV Cell/Module Producers, 2002 
 
Top PV Manufacturers by Country/Region, 2002
W. Europe 
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Calculated w ith data from Paul Maycock, PV New s, May 2003
 
(Based on MW manufactured in 2002)
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Table 1: Average Prices (€/MWh) Paid for Renewable Electricity  
in 11 European Countries, 2002; and in Germany 2003 and 2004 
Country Small Hydro Wind Biomass PV Other 
Austria 25 (pool price + 
green certificate) 
or 32 (R) 
73.5-109 (R; and 
investment costs) 
47.7-174.5 (S) 358-726 (R)  
Denmark  57.6 (rate under 
old pricing 
system) 
Farm biogas: 80 
(for 10 years) 
  
France Pre-2001: 28.81 
(summer - su); 
71.65 (winter - w); 
Post-2001: 
44.5/84.2 (su/w; 
<500kVA); 
40.1/75.8 (su/w; 
>500kVA)1 
83.8 (first 5 years); 
30.5-83.8 
(depending on 
output; for next 10 
years)2 
Landfill gas 
only: 57.2 (< 
2MW); 45 (>6 
MW) 
87 (<10 
kWp); 152.5 
(to start soon, 
if not already 
in effect); 305 
(Corsica & 
overseas) 
 
Great 
Britain 
 39 (pool) + 49 
(green certificate)3 
   
Ireland4 64.1 (weighted 
average price) 
47.23-52.97 (<3 
MW); 45.47-48.12 
(>3 MW) 
37.65-59.16   
Italy  46 (pool price) + 
67 (green 
certificate)5 
   
Netherlands  77.1 (Pool + green 
certificates) 
   
Portugal6 69.1 (up to 10 
MVA) 
75.56-83.1 
(depending on 
hours in operation; 
up to 2800 h) 
61.984 393.84 
(<5kW); 
229.56 
(>5kW) 
Wave: 
223.391 
Spain7 
(up to 50 
MW) 
63.827 (up to 10 
MW) 
62.806;  
or market price + 
2.89 (premium) 
Primary 
biomass: 
61.724; 
Other: 3.5% less 
3978 (<5kW); 
217 (>5kW) 
 
                                                 
1 Additional bonus of 7-7.5 €/MWh in winter for regularity. 
2 For plants up to 1,500 MW; 10% decrease for larger plants. 
3 Maximum value for Green Certificates, calculated according to expected penalty. 
4 Contract prices under the Alternative Energy Requirement tendering competitions. 
5 Maximum price for 2002. Green certificates work for the first 8 years; from then on producers receive only 
pool price. 
6 Fixed prices are updated monthly, according to inflation. Fixed prices for PV are in place until total capacity 
reaches 50 MW; wave prices in place up to 20 MW of national capacity. 
7 These are fixed prices, except for the market price plus premium listed included here for wind. Spain’s support 
system also offers hourly pool electricity price plus a fixed premium. 
8 Available until Spain reaches total PV capacity of 50 MW. 
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Sweden 24 (market price) 
+ 10 (for plants 
<1,500 kW) + 
10% of investment 
cost 
24 (market price) 
+ 29 (for plants 
<1,500 kW) + 
10% of investment 
cost 
24 (market 
price) + 10 (for 
plants <1,500 
kW) + 25% of 
investment cost 
24 (market 
price) + 10 
(for plants 
<1,500 kW) 
 
Germany 
(2002) 
(tariff 
duration 20 
years) 
76.7 (<500 kW); 
66.5-76.7 
(500kW-5 MW)9 
89 (first 5 years); 
61 (yrs 6-20) 
General 
biomass: 84-101 
(S); Landfill & 
sewage: 66-77 
(S) 
481  Geothermal 
89 (< 20 
MW); 
72 (>20 
MW) 
Germany 
(2003) 
(tariff 
duration 20 
years) 
76.5 (<500 kW); 
66.3 (< 5 MW) 
89 (first 5 years 
onshore; first 9 
years offshore); 60 
(final tariffs)  
100 (<500 kW); 
90 (500-5,000 
kW); 85 (5-20 
MW). Landfill/ 
sewage gas: 76.5 
(<500 kW); 66.3 
(< 5 MW) 
457 Geothermal 
89.3 (<20 
MW); 71.4 
(> 20 MW) 
Germany 
(2004) 
(tariff 
duration 20 
years) 
76.5 (<500 kW); 
66.3 (< 5 MW) 
88 (first 5 years 
onshore; first 9 
years offshore); 59 
(final tariffs) 
(tariff duration 20 
years) 
99 (<500 kW); 
89 (500-5,000 
kW); 84 (5-20 
MW). Landfill/ 
sewage gas: 76.5 
(<500 kW); 66.3 
(< 5 MW) 
457 + 
117 (roof 
installations 
<30kW); 
93 (roof; >30 
kW); 
50 (facades)10 
Geothermal 
89.3 (<20 
MW); 71.4 
(> 20 MW) 
S = depending on size of plant; R = depending on region of plant. 
(Sources: EREF, 2002; Lackmann, 2002; APPA, 2002; WCRE, 2003) 
 
Table 2: Renewable energy installations in India, 31 March 2003 
 
 
Technology 
Capacity 
Installed (MW) 
World 
Ranking 
Wind 1,870 5th 
Small hydro  
(up to 25 MW) 1,509.24 10
th 
Biomass power 483.9 4th 
Biomass gasifiers 53.4 1st 
Photovoltaics 121 5th 
(Source: MNES, 2003) 
                                                 
9 Fixed prices apply for plants commissioned during 2002, for a period of 20 years, except for hydropower, 
which receives prices permanently. 
10 Additional payment is to take the place of 100,000 roof program, which ended summer 2003. A total capacity 
limit of 1,000 MW (to receive tariffs) has been eliminated. 
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Endnotes: 
 
1 A BET-Study estimates that the price increase for electricity consumers caused by the pricing law was only 
0.11 €cent/kWh in 2000, and will be 0.19 €cent/kWh in 10 years assuming a doubling of renewables’ share of 
total generation (Lackmann, 2002). A German government article estimates the extra cost at an average of € 8 
per German household each year (EoG, 2003). A third estimate puts additional costs at 0.25 €cents/kWh in 2001, 
a number that has been accepted by authorities of the German federal states (Uh, 2003 and 2004). 
2 At least one expert notes that, once the best resources are no longer available, there will be no difference in 
costs, but countries with pricing systems will have domestic industries while those with quota systems will not 
(Uh, 2003). 
3 Note, however, that both California and New Jersey are now considering increasing the targets under their 
quota (RPS) systems. 
4 Rural households that are off-grid pay US$ 3-15 per month for energy in the form of kerosene, candles, battery 
charging and disposable batteries (Reiche et al, 2000). 
5 The total project is 2.1 MW, including an existing plant erected in 1997. Construction costs of the new project, 
of 1.058 MW, are about € 5.5 million. 
6 Note that cars manufactured to run on gasoline can operate, without any modification, on a blend of up to 24-
26 percent alcohol. 
7 The manufacture of fertilizers, and extraction and purification can be very energy intensive, but not in Brazil 
b/c much of work is done by hand. 
8 The $ 4.50/W rebate is as of mid- to late-2003; the investment tax credits drops to 7.5 percent for 2004 and 
2005. 
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